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Abstract
The existence of a self-regulating arbitrage mechanism under the gold standard has been tradi-
tionally considered as one of its main advantages, and attracted a corresponding research interest.
This research is arguably relevant not only to test for the e±ciency of the \gold points", but also to
study the evolution of ¯nancial integration during the so-called ¯rst era of globalization. Our ¯rst
aim with this paper is to contribute to the enlargement of the scope of the literature by considering
the case of Portugal that adhered to the system, in 1854, at a much earlier phase than the ma-
jority of countries, thus allowing for a broader perspective on the evolution of the e±ciency of the
foreign exchange market. As a typical \peripheral" country, Portugal can be used as the starting
point for a study of the degree of integration of the periphery within the system. Furthermore,
the Portuguese exchange also illustrates the role in practice of large players in sustaining currency
stability, over and beyond the atomistic forces of arbitrage and speculation assumed in conven-
tional theoretical frameworks. We also address the question of the credibility of the authorities'
commitment to the standard, through the perspective of the target zone literature.
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1The wise course, therefore, is to keep him shut in the
shiny cage of gold reserves. For nothing could be more
secure than such a golden cage. It has a though °exibil-
ity. If the beast grows larger, the space between the bars
grows larger. If it grows smaller, it narrows. If we keep
our specie reserves adequate, we prevent a falling o® of
our exchange rate, and we gain the con¯dence of other
nations.1
1 Introduction
Among the burgeoning literature on the gold standard, a strand has been dedicated to the estimation
of the e±ciency of the system, somehow de¯ned in terms of a measure of exchange rate stability within
the bands delimited by the \gold points". These studies are relevant not only to test for the traditional
arguments about the stability derived from international arbitrage and speculation, under a credible
gold standard, but also to study the evolution of ¯nancial integration during the so-called ¯rst era of
globalization. Despite the obvious interest in extending such inquiry, the literature is characterized
by a greater variation in methodologies than geographical or time breadth. To our knowledge, only
two bilateral exchange markets have been studied so far: the dollar/ sterling (O±cer 1996, Spiller
and Wood 1988, Canjels et al. 2004), and the franc/ sterling (Flandreau 1995, Boyer-Xambeau et al.
1994). Moreover, the latter case does not entirely ¯t with the standard gold points model, because of
the bimetallic nature of the French monetary system until 1873.
The lopsided nature of the literature seems to be the result, on the one hand, of the extensive data
requirements, and of the persistence of controversies about the best methodology for measuring market
integration, on the other. Our aim with this paper is to contribute to the enlargement of the scope of
the literature by considering the case of a country, Portugal, that adhered to the system, in 1854, at a
much earlier phase than the US or France, thus allowing for a broader perspective on the evolution of
the e±ciency of the foreign exchange market.
This is not the only reason, however, for the interest in the Portuguese case. As a typical \periph-
eral" country, Portugal can be used as the starting point for a study of the degree of integration of
the periphery within the system. A relatively happy and lengthy experience with the gold standard
seems a worthwhile object of study, especially given the potentially problematic nature of Portuguese
fundamentals.
Secondly, despite being a fairly liquid market, the Portuguese exchange against London also illus-
trates the role in practice of large players in sustaining currency stability, over and beyond the atomistic
forces of arbitrage and speculation assumed in conventional theoretical frameworks. The legal require-
ment to guarantee convertibility imposed upon the Bank of Portugal, a private corporation, often led
it to intervene in the market to sustain the exchange near to parity, in order to avoid costly arbitrage.
1Mishima, Yukio (1973), Runaway Horses, New York: Alfred A. Knopf (1st. ed. 1969), p. 165.
2Lastly, we address the question of the credibility of the authorities' commitment to the standard, but
approach it through the perspective of the target zone literature (TZ).
The article is structured as follows. The ¯rst two sections provide an abstract of the major facts
of the Portuguese experience with the gold standard, and a brief description of the workings of the
foreign exchange market in Lisbon. In the wake of the methodological debate in the literature, we
follow two empirical strategies. On the one hand, we o®er a detailed reconstruction of the gold points
based on weekly data of the foreign exchange market at Lisbon, and on extensive accounting records of
gold transactions actually done by the Bank of Portugal during the period. On the other, we use the
techniques of threshold autoregressions to estimate a theoretical model of arbitrage similar to Canjels
et al. (2004). These two alternatives have a preliminary presentation in section 4. Section 5 then
details the main data sources used to form our series of the exchange rate of the pound sterling in
Lisbon, and of the costs of gold arbitrage between London and Lisbon. Section 6 is the core of the
paper, and reviews in succession four topics { the direct reconstruction of the gold points, the indirect
estimates of the same points, the workings of the Portuguese gold standard as a credible TZ, and the
evidence on gold °ows between Portugal and Britain. Some concluding remarks follow, and we also
include two technical Appendices.
2 The Gold Standard in Portugal
After Britain, Portugal was the ¯rst country in Europe to join the gold standard, in 1854. As a
result, although it also became inconvertible earlier than most, in 1891, it still remains among those
with the longest histories of association with the \classic" era of this regime.
Several reasons dictated this adoption but, perhaps because its entry into this \club" was so preco-
cious, they are not those that have been adduced by some recent authors regarding the movement to
gold in the 1870s (Gallarotti 1995). Obviously, it was not a case of trying to reap network economies
- also described in this literature as the \chain e®ect" - as happened later when an increasing number
of economies adhered to this standard and thereby formed an informal international monetary union.
Nor does it seem to have been an attempt to capitalize on a monetary standard that came to be recog-
nized as a badge of ¯nancial integrity that would facilitate access to foreign capital markets. Indeed,
what mattered most to London bankers regarding Portugal, at this time, was government stability and
political will to meet commitments. As some of them told the Portuguese ambassador in London, \in
order that our funds be employed in Portugal it is necessary ¯rst that you assure us that contracts will
be religiously observed and that public tranquillity will not be disturbed" (Reis 1996: 176). There is
no evidence either that the decision had anything to do with socio-economic cleavages generated by the
monetary issue. Portugal, one of the poorest nations of Europe, was predominantly agricultural and its
\urban-industrial class" was diminutive, none of them features alleged by this literature as favorable
to the adoption of gold. Finally it should be noted that, in 1854, silver or bimetallism were regarded
by many as a more robust solution than gold given the risks caused by gold mining development in
3Asia and North America, and already made obvious, since 1851, by the steady fall of the gold-silver
ratio.
In fact, Portugal joined the gold standard for pragmatic, rather than ideological or \scienti¯c" rea-
sons, and in response to the particular historical circumstances of the moment (Flandreau 1996). The
most important of these was the need felt by governments for an e®ective and enduring reform of the
monetary system. Since the mid 1840s, the latter had been bedevilled by a scarcity of sound means of
payment, a confusing multiplicity of legalized foreign coin - at a peak they reached thirty six - and a
plethora of often contradictory legislation that allowed three di®erent metallic proofs (French, English
and Spanish) and two types of paper money to circulate at the same time.
Although public discussion was riven with doubts as to the best choice, the logic of adopting an
arrangement closely modelled on the British one was a strong one. One reason was that Britain had
long been Portugal's main trading partner (Fisher 1971). By the 1840s and 1850s, this corresponded
to 50% of Portugal's trade, not to mention the additional 20% with Brazil, a country very much in
the British sphere of economic in°uence. Moreover, London was where most of the Portuguese foreign
debt service was paid. A second reason was the tradition of a gold circulation which went back to
the early 18th century, ¯rst fuelled by the rich mines of Brazil, and later reinforced by the military
expenditures in sovereigns by Portugal's Oldest Ally, during the Napoleonic period and subsequent
civil disturbances. In the third place, for a penurious government, the gold standard was clearly more
attractive because it would cost much less to implement than other solutions. By the early 1850s,
owing to earlier monetary policies which had overvalued gold, most of the coin in circulation was made
of this metal anyway and, in fact, sovereigns seem to have prevailed. A silver standard, on the other
hand, would have required importing a large quantity of this metal for minting - perhaps the equivalent
of 10% of GDP - and selling o® the nation's gold, probably at a declining price in a market which was
over°owing with this commodity. Last of all, it was evident that the proposed system had worked well
in Britain for over thirty years and had not prevented this country from becoming one of the world's
most powerful in economic terms.
During the ensuing decades, Portugal remained locked into to the gold standard and though the
conditions that led to its enactment changed, new advantages continued to justify the country's strict
adherence to this policy. In particular, the spread of a globalization process focused on core economies
that were also \gold club" members made it increasingly compelling, in terms of trade and capital
movements, to belong too.
The Portuguese monetary law of 1854 set up a system that conformed in every way to the text
book version of the gold standard. Full legal tender was kept for only new Portuguese gold coins (all
the old vintages were withdrawn) and sovereigns and half sovereigns, the facial value for all of them
being de¯ned by their respective metallic content at the ¯xed exchange rate of 4500 Portuguese r¶ eis to
the pound. Silver became a token means of payment. Its legal tender was restricted to 5000 r¶ eis per
transaction and its total issue was calculated to be what would be strictly su±cient for the economy's
need for small transactions. Gold and silver could be freely used in any form (coin or bar) and amount,
and there were no limits to either their import or export, although the latter, in the case of gold, was
4subject to a small tax until 1886. Non-monetary gold could be freely transformed into coin at the Mint
by any member of the public, who could have the reverse operation performed there as well. Although
no law ever expressly stated it, there were also no impediments to the free movement of capital in and
out of Portugal, a fundamental requirement of such a regime, along with free convertibility and a ¯xed
exchange rate.
In practice, it was a \full" gold standard, as opposed to a \limping" one, in that a large fraction of
total monetary circulation was made up of gold coin, representing around 70% of M1 on average. Most
of this was in the hands of the public. If the demand for cash increased, it was more easily satis¯ed
by importing sovereigns from England than gold bars, which would have to be melted and converted
into legal Portuguese coin at the Mint. Gold bars were therefore rarely found in the market and were
sought after mostly for industrial purposes. Since notes and deposits had a low demand there was no
need for the ¯nancial institutions that issued them to keep more than a small share of total gold as
reserves.
There was hardly any intervention by governments in monetary matters during this period. They
never attempted to issue their own ¯duciary money, nor did they force the issuing banks to make loans
to the state beyond their means in return for being allowed to put more notes into circulation. In
particular, governments took little initiative to produce coin through the Mint, with the result that by
1890 Portuguese specie accounted for less than a tenth of all gold coin in the country. The bulk of the
variations in the supply of gold coin (and indeed of all money) was thus left to market forces acting
freely through the import and export of sovereigns by private operators. Nevertheless, the system
functioned with considerable success and assured the economy of a money supply that kept more than
adequate pace with the needs of a slowly expanding economy. While M1 grew at 3.3% per annum
over the entire gold standard period, GDP increased by around 1%, allowing therefore for the needs of
the increasing monetization of this society and for its fairly high propensity for hoarding gold. Prices
showed slight change, and short run °uctuations were far from strong. Fixed parity and the other basic
gold standard rules were consistently and faithfully observed throughout, and at no time was public
consideration given to the possibility of abandoning them in any way. The only suspension of bank note
convertibility to be allowed by the authorities occurred in 1876 and lasted a few days only. Portugal
was thus remarkably free from the \convertibility crises, devaluations and internal dislocations" that
beset the countries of the periphery who adopted this regime in the 19th century (Eichengreen 1985:
18).
In comparative terms, Portugal's experience with this monetary regime was unusual. While on the
surface it was a \well-behaved" member of the club, in fact it failed two crucial criteria. It su®ered
from persistent de¯cits both on its budget and on its balance of trade. Thanks to vigorous borrowing in
the market, it avoided monetizing the ¯rst, though relative to GDP the long-term debt almost doubled
between the early 1860s and the late 1880s (Reis 2002). The solution for the second problem was to
rely on the private and public capital in°ows, as well as a growing stream of remittances by emigrants
residing in Brazil. The combined e®ect of all this was that monetary growth did not generate in°ation-
ary pressure and the exchange rate was stable. Thus, outwardly the country satis¯ed the prerequisites
5for wearing the international 'seal of approval' conferred by gold standard adherence, whilst in fact
it deviated signi¯cantly from the basic norms followed by the majority of countries that earned this
distinction (Bordo and Rocko® 1996). Portugal was not, however, a case of a 'de¯cit without tears',
as Peter Lindert (1969) has put it. The market looked behind appearances, at the fundamentals, and,
as a result, the yield on Portuguese bonds was always considerably higher than that of consols.
The gold standard ended on the day that the government found itself with no other recourse than
to borrow heavily from the Bank of Portugal, after foreign and domestic capital markets had closed
their doors to it. In order to satisfy this pressing ¯nancial need, the Bank was forced to over-issue and
the inevitable run ensued, draining most of its reserves and making a legally-sanctioned suspension
of payments inevitable. The country remained inconvertible thereafter, and in 1892 the ¯nal nail was
driven into the co±n of Portugal international ¯nancial reputation, when the government also defaulted
partially on the service of the Public Debt.
There are several interpretations for this course of events. For Val¶ erio and Mata (1994), the long
term survival of the gold standard was impossible given the persistent worsening of the two de¯cits
mentioned above and in 1891, a chance conjunction of highly adverse exogenous circumstances precip-
itated the demise of gold. The Baring crisis in 1890 made ¯nancial markets nervous about lending to
South-American type countries. Following the abolition of slavery and the fall of the monarchy, the
Brazilian exchange rate dropped 60% during 1890-1 and set o® a steep decline in emigrant remittances
to Portugal. In southern Africa, Britain clashed with Portugal over disputed territories, which led
to doubts in London over Portugal's political stability and its ¯nancial capacity to sustain such an
unequal military con°ict. Fundamentally, however, this view argues that a fall could not have been
avoided by the end of a decade during which the service of the foreign debt rose from 21 to 47% of
exports and the foreign debt increased from 34 to 43% of GDP. As Salazar was to comment in 1916,
\the falsity of the situation was too great for it to be maintained inde¯nitely" (1997: 54).
A second view, which is also based on the notion of the long term non-sustainability of the gold stan-
dard, focuses instead on the rigidity of internal prices as the fundamental cause of its demise (Llona
Rodriguez 1997). In this \dependent economy" model, it is claimed that one of its structural features
was that the price of non-tradables was excessively rigid relative to that of tradables. Thus, during the
1880s, the fall of the latter was not accompanied by that of non-tradables, and this generated a pres-
sure on the balance of trade, which already was in the customary de¯cit. Under these circumstances,
a return to equilibrium would require either a nominal devaluation (which was impossible under the
gold standard) or an increased in°ow of capital and/or remittances (which actually happened in some
years). These °ows, however, helped to further sustain the rigidity of the price of non-tradables and
therefore delayed the adjustment. On the other hand, sooner or later external ¯nancial resources were
likely to run out. If non-tradable prices continued to resist the downward pressure, as they did owing
to presumed market imperfections, the economy would start to lose external reserves, and this is what
happened. In the event, it was very sudden and brutal, in the manner already described, but such an
outcome was inescapable, unless the structure of the Portuguese market for goods was to become more
°exible.
6While recognizing these adverse trends, a di®erent reading of the facts, would stress the resilience of
the Portuguese gold standard over 37 years helped by the international reputation that this conferred
on the country.2 In this perspective, strong, austere domestic policies to ¯ght the crisis, as happened
after the suspension of convertibility in 1846, could have built on such an obvious commitment to gold
(Bordo and Kydland 1995) and restored the standard in a few years, as indeed happened in some Latin
American countries, once the storm was over. This was a short term problem caused by a momentary
shock but what was lacking in Portugal at this time was the political resolve to curb public expenditure,
withdraw the subsidies that were propping up certain large, quasi-bankrupt companies, increase ¯scal
revenue, and create conditions that would attract °eeing capital back to the country.
3 The Market for Foreign Exchange
Despite the paucity of research and evidence on the history of the Portuguese market for foreign
exchange, it is possible nevertheless to outline its most important characteristics from the point of view
of the analysis that is to follow. To begin with, it is clear that from the 18th century at least, there
was a signi¯cant activity of arbitrage, both of bills of exchange and precious metals. The numerous
books used at the time for the professional education of merchants and their clerks a®ord a wealth of
detail about how these transactions were carried out between Portugal's two main port cities - Lisbon
and Porto - and the rest of the world. They show, for example, what calculations must be made in
order to estimate their pro¯tability, or how to decide which currencies and which foreign places to use
in multi-stage operations, and suggest, by means of detailed exercises, the importance of possessing a
solid practical knowledge for anyone practicing in this ¯eld (Mendon» ca 1823).
By the end of the 18th century, the market had been formally organized, with a number of approved
brokers who had the duty to provide regular and reliable price information, as well as, naturally, that
of bringing together the \ultimate transactors", who needed to buy or sell bills for themselves (O±cer
1996: 209). A sign of its dynamism is the occurrence of a considerable amount of parallel, informal
dealing, often by foreign, unauthorized brokers, but there are also hints of strong price oscillation and
complaints of \oppression" by certain participants, which suggest that it was far from perfect. Al-
though it was an undi®erentiated market, where commodities, freights, insurance and stocks were also
traded, the main business was in bills and these were predominantly sterling denominated (Justino
1994). It is not clear whether dealers, as opposed to brokers, had much of a presence in it yet.
By the 1850s, the scene had changed to quite an extent. Governments continued to pursue interven-
tionist goals and succeeded in establishing a body of o±cial brokers, a schedule of fees and strict rules
on publicity for prices. Most of this by now greatly expanded activity seems to have happened outside
this regulated area, in brokers' exchange shops, at the counters of corporate and private banks, and
in informal gatherings known as bolsins. Specialization in bills of exchange had separated completely
from other traded items, and there was intense competition over fees, as the records of the Bank of
Portugal reveal. The Portuguese trade in bills had become strongly concentrated in Lisbon, to which
2Some of these ideas are suggested in Reis (2000).
7the lesser port city markets, such as Porto, Madeira, Algarve and the Azores were linked by reasonable
communications and through the branches, agents and commissioners of the Lisbon banks. This is
hardly surprising, considering not only the predominant role of the capital city in the country's foreign
trade, but also the fact that it had the largest banks, besides the representative o±ces of the Porto
banks, the largest share of government bond holdings, and the largest and probably most monetized
urban population. Moreover, as the seat of government, it harbored the substantial ¯nancial activity
of the Public Debt O±ce, which was responsible for external payments on account of the service of the
foreign debt. This probably came to some 25% of all public expenditure, not to mention the external
transactions of other government departments.
A fairly standard description of a foreign exchange market emerges from a report, published in 1883
by the Bank of Portugal.3 Bills were supplied by recipients of remittances and dividends from Brazil,
by commodity exporters (e.g. wine dealers) and by exporters of sovereigns. The demand came from
the government, for its payments abroad, commodity importers and the Bank of Portugal, as a ma-
jor importer of sovereigns. Since these various °ows were concentrated at di®erent moments in the
year, an opportunity arose for dealers, who had access to credit, to pro¯t from uncovered transactions
that ironed out the oscillations in the exchange rate produced by this frequent but normal mismatch
between supply and demand. In Lisbon, it was banks and bankers that performed this function of
\temporal integration", thanks to the credits they could draw on in places like London when there was
a shortage of bills in Portugal. When the exchange became favorable, they would buy bills cheaply at
home and use them to cover their foreign debits. A facilitating function was provided by brokers, who
searched the market for suitable paper for buyers, or then for clients for paper they had on o®er, while
continuously providing their contacts with information on the evolution of the exchange rate. The
Bank of Portugal had a dedicated broker already in 1864 and paid him a commission, but considered
itself free to resort to any other broker it chose, a sign of the mobility within this market.4
Within this context, the Bank of Portugal was a case on its own. It started acting as an arbitrageur
in the early 1860s, having discovered that this was a pro¯table line of business and that, having a
capacity to ¯nance itself in London on a large scale, it could reap the economies of scale that foreign
exchange transactions o®er. Soon, however, it also found that whenever the exchange rate approached
the gold export point, it was having to use its portfolio of bills and drafts on London correspondents
in order, either to import sovereigns, so as to strengthen reserves depleted by a gold drain; or then to
intervene in the market for bills so as to drive their price away from the gold export point. Both types
of operation entailed a loss. The unwritten but ¯rm rule, however, was that as a privileged bank of
issue, it had the obligation to prevent any commercial disturbances that might arise owing to sharp
contractions in the money supply (Arag~ ao 1964, Banco de Portugal 1883). Banking wisdom held that
when the balance of payments was unfavorable, an alternative action, was to raise the discount rate
and thus make the adjustment easier. But by law the Bank was not allowed to do this except under
the most stringent conditions, and as time went by it found itself therefore increasingly obliged to get
3Banco de Portugal (1883).
4Minutes of the Board of Directors, 26 February 1864, Bank of Portugal Archive.
8involved in both types of \gold device". Only in this way could it maintain not only the level of its
notes and of the reserves that backed them, but also that of the national supply of monetized gold,
despite repeated adverse pressures on the Portuguese balance of payments (Reis 2002).
During the period we are considering, the Bank thus found itself in contradictory roles in the ex-
change market. At times, it was a pro¯t-seeking arbitrageur. At others, it had the loss-making duty of
stabilizing the exchange rate and protecting the money supply from shocks. This had two consequences.
One was that the Bank paradoxically su®ered frequent annual losses on an account that should have
been a money spinner (Reis 2002). The other was that it rose to major player in this market, not just
because of its exceptional resources, but also because this was the only way of intervening as often and
e®ectively as the situation required. The available evidence shows that this predominance enabled it
to in°uence the exchange rate, in the short run, but not to sustain any position inde¯nitely.5 After a
certain time, either an inversion of the market caused by exogenous forces must occur, or the discount
rate had to be used at last in order to restore the balance of trade or encourage an inward movement of
capital. An illustration of the Bank's ambiguous relationship with the market comes from late 1864, at
a moment when the exchange rate had been close to the gold export point for some time. Two impor-
tant Lisbon arbitrageurs, who needed to cover their positions in London, demanded that the Bank sell
them sterling bills or drafts at the price that it would cost them to export sovereigns, otherwise they
would resort to such a measure. The Bank of Portugal had no alternative but to comply, although in
the previous September its board had proclaimed that it was able to determine the sterling rate by
o®ering to sell paper on London at a suitable price. In other words, its market dominance gave the
Bank the in°uence but did not make it the uncontested leader. Rather it was a market follower, be-
cause it could not act preemptively in this respect, either because it lacked the information or because
it hoped to put o® the costly necessity of doing so. Above all, as in all foreign exchange interventions,
it lacked the in¯nite resources needed for correcting a chronically unbalanced situation.
4 Methodology
Among the several possible techniques for estimating market integration, or arbitrage e±ciency
catalogued by O±cer (1996: 177-21), we decided to try and apply the two that seem to have attracted
the most interest in the literature. The ¯rst one is O±cer's own method of direct reconstruction
of the several components of transaction costs conceivably associated with gold arbitrage. This is a
very data-intensive exercise in retrospective accounting, but we were fortunate to gain access to an
extremely detailed record of actual gold shipments during the period when Portugal was on gold.
The second method follows a small literature that attempts to recover the \gold points" (the limits
of the °uctuation band of the exchange under the gold standard) from the preferences revealed in
the exchange rate series itself. The latter method replaces a fully speci¯ed model of arbitrage for
the detailed data gathering of the former method. In this sense its results depend crucially on the
assumptions regarding the preferences of the arbitrageurs and the technology of arbitrage, and also on
5This is based on a reading of the board's minutes and correspondence with foreign and local banks.
9the estimation technique chosen to operationalize the theoretical model.6
4.1 Retrospective accounting
A preliminary step to reconstruct the transaction costs of gold arbitrage is to identify the dominant
agents in the foreign exchange market, the prevailing instruments for arbitrage, and also the preferred
type of gold specie used in international shipments. The two last questions are relatively simple to
address, compared to the ¯rst one. In fact, an answer to the ¯rst question requires a judgement on
two related points: the major center of arbitrage, and the type of agents involved in it. Not having
found, so far, decisive documental evidence to support either claim, we will base our estimations on
the assumption of a Lisbon-based arbitrage essentially run by large ¯nancial institutions (banks or
banking houses). That the Portuguese currency was at best of marginal interest to the London-based
¯nancial houses and banks seems obvious from the small share of Portugal in British economic interests
abroad. The interest in establishing a London market for drafts in Portuguese currency seems therefore
very remote.7 Quite the reverse was the case in Portugal, which, in the period we are covering, had
between a third and half of its total foreign trade done with Great Britain, and who placed 60% of
its government external funded debt in London.8 We choose to concentrate on the largest members
of the ¯nancial community in Lisbon, because only they would probably have had the access to funds
and information to make it worthwhile to engage in foreign exchange arbitrage, besides enjoying the
advantage of being charged lower commissions by their correspondents abroad.
The relevance of this assumption lies in the fact that it conditions the data collection. Accordingly,
we reconstructed a series of the exchange rate for sterling in Lisbon (instead of the real in London),
and tried to estimate the transaction costs that a Lisbon-based arbitrageur would face. The choice of
the largest banks and banking houses as the typical arbitrageurs also has an impact, albeit smaller, on
the de¯nition of the elements of the transaction costs (more on this in sub-section 5.2).
On the determination of the typical foreign exchange instruments, all documentary sources agree
on the regular use of the sterling bill or, later, of the checks drawn on London, by contrast with the
marginal importance of cable operations, long after the ¯rst international cable connections had been
established.9 Indeed, only for the very last year of our sample did cable rates on London start to be
published regularly. As late as 1913, a contemporary author indirectly described the nature of the
foreign exchange instruments as follows:
The favorable exchange means the low price of the short term exchange paper, be it repre-
sented by a trade bill drawn against the payment of exported merchandize, by a check sent
from abroad or bought by the broker, by a government debt coupon, or by an entitlement
6To gauge the degree of variation in model speci¯cation and estimation compare the earlier attempt by Spiller &
Wood (1988) to the more recent endeavors of Canjels et al. (2004).
7An anecdote about this marginality is the fact that the Economist stopped publishing the Portuguese exchange on
London in 1870, a necessary piece of information for two-point arbitrage.
8Data from Lains (1999) and Esteves (2002), respectively.
9The ¯rst submarine cable, connecting Lisbon to England and Gibraltar, entered service in 1870.
10to dividends or commercial interest, etc.10.
We leave the details of the identi¯cation of which bills and types of specie were used, in several periods,
to the next section. We ¯nish with a description of the sequence of operations required to complete
the two types of gold arbitrage, which is necessary in order to understand the enumeration of the
transaction costs, dealt with also in the next section.
In the case of the import of gold, the arbitrageur would start by buying sterling bills of a certain
maturity at their market price in Lisbon. Then, he would send the said bills to London, where he
would have them discounted at the going market rate. The proceeds from this would then be used to
buy gold from the Bank of England, at the price charged by this institution. Finally, the gold would
be shipped back to Lisbon, and sold there at the o±cial Mint parity. This operation would only be
pro¯table if the current exchange rate was su±ciently low relative to par (appreciation), so that the
di®erence between the par and the current exchange rate would be greater than the transaction costs
involved. Otherwise, it would not take place.
Conversely, an export of gold to London would start with the sale of sterling bills in Lisbon, at the
current market price, the proceeds of which would be used to buy gold. The bills, and a fraction of the
gold would then be shipped to London, where the gold would be used to buy the amount in pounds
(again at the price o®ered by the Bank of England) necessary to repay the bills. The proceeds of the
operation would be the di®erence between the original exchange rate in Lisbon and the par value, after
deducting the corresponding transaction costs.
Both cases are essentially riskless, because the foreign exchange transaction is completed at the
beginning (with the sale or purchase of the sterling bills), and the remaining prices were typically held
constant under the gold standard. It is in this sense that we refer to these transactions as \arbitrage",
as they do not involve any signi¯cant measure of expectations on the future values of the relevant
variables (speculation).11
4.2 Revealed preferences
We now pass to the description of a partial equilibrium model for the foreign exchange in Lisbon,
along the lines of Canjels et al. (2004). This model can be solved, and estimated, from only 3 simple
relations that describe preferences and technology. The ¯rst is the market demand for sterling bills in
Lisbon:
Et = ® ¡ ¯Bt + ut (1)
in which Et is the market exchange rate for bills of a certain maturity, Bt is the stock of sterling bills
available in Lisbon, and ut is an error term, probably nonstationary and serially correlated.12




11In fact, there was also no liquid futures market in Lisbon during this period.
12Bt is expressed in pounds sterling. Et is the price of a pound in r¶ eis.
11where p$
G is the Mint price of gold in pounds, and ¢Gt is the net gold in°ow into Lisbon from London.13
This speci¯cation implies that the sole source of bills in Lisbon comes from arbitrage operations,
which although convenient for keeping the model under manageable proportions may underestimate
the supply of bills. First, it is not clear that \trade bills", accumulated as a counterpart to exports
to the UK, would not be bought for arbitrage purposes. Secondly, emigrant remittances from Brazil
were also typically transferred to Portugal via sterling bills bought in Rio de Janeiro, and sent to
Lisbon. Finally, the Portuguese banks themselves issued drafts in sterling, which they would cover
in London, either by selling sterling assets there or by using the credit lines they had with London
banks.14 However, at this stage, we are not sure how to adjust the model for these additional levels of
complexity, so that we will work with the same framework of Canjels et al. (2004) bearing in mind its
limitations.






a + b0¢Gt + 1
2c0¢G2
t if ¢Gt > 0
a + b1¢Gt + 1
2c1¢G2
t if ¢Gt < 0
(3)
That is, we allow for varying (arguably decreasing) marginal costs with the amount shipped, and also
for asymmetric costs between gold export and import.15
From these three simple equations, it is possible to derive a closed-form solution for the dynamics
of the exchange rate, by using simple economic intuition. Take the case of gold import. Marginal cost
and marginal revenue for this transaction are given by:16
MCt = b0 + c0¢Gt (4)
MRt = (Epar ¡ Et¡1)p$
G (5)
Arbitrageurs will import gold up to the point when








which gives the optimal level of gold import, in case the exchange rate falls su±ciently below the par.
Repeating the argument for gold export we get to:
¢Gt =
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Now replace (2) in (1) to get:
¢Et = ¯p$
G¢Gt + vt (8)
13As described in the previous subsection, a gold export(import) operation involves an increase (decrease) of the stock
of sterling bills in Lisbon. Hence, the negative sign in equation (2).
14More on this in section 6.
15All coe±cients are positive, except c1, because in the second branch of the cost function ¢G < 0.
16Notice that the marginal revenue is de¯ned by comparing the par with the lagged exchange rate, or the exchange
rate observed at the moment of decision to engage in arbitrage.
12where vt = ¢ut is assumed to be stationary. Finally, replace (7) into (8):
¢xt =
8
> > > <
> > > :
¡¸0 (xt¡1 ¡ °0) + vt if xt¡1 < °0
vt if °0 · xt¡1 · °1
¡¸1 (xt¡1 ¡ °1) + vt if xt¡1 > °1
(9)
in which xt ´ Et¡Epar is the exchange rate deviation from par. Equation (9) has a direct interpretation
in terms of the dynamics of the exchange rate in a gold standard regime. In this context, °0 and °1 are
respectively the gold import and export points. Inside the band de¯ned by them, the exchange follows
a pure random walk, whereas outside the bands it follows an AR(1) process that converges back to
the bands with speeds ¸0 and ¸1.17 The comparative statics of these four parameters with respect
to the parameters of the original equations (1)-(3) is also intuitive. The absolute values of the gold
points increase with the intercept of the marginal cost (the bs). As for the speeds of convergence, they
decrease with the slope of the marginal cost (the cs), and increase with ¯, the slope parameter of the
demand function for sterling bills in Lisbon. Why the speed of convergence decreases with the slope of
the marginal costs of arbitrage is simple to understand, and, in the limit, with a constant marginal cost
(c0 = c1 = 0) the adjustment would be instantaneous. Likewise, because ¯ measures the sensitivity
of the market exchange rate to the amount of bills (and, through (2), to gold movements), the higher
this sensitivity the higher the speed of convergence of Et back to the band.
The interest of this derivation comes not only from the simplicity of the closed form of (9), but also
from its direct correspondence with a class of discrete-time econometric models. As stated, equation
(9) can be estimated as a threshold autoregressive model (TAR) with 3 regimes, order 1, and with
a delay parameter also of 1. In short, a TAR(3,1,1) model. These models are fairly straightforward
to estimate by Conditioned Least Squares (CLS), and their asymptotic properties have already been
established by Chan & Tsay (1998) for the continuous case, which is precisely the formulation of (9).18
In particular, these authors have shown that all the parameters of the model (°0;°1;¸0;and ¸1) are
p
N-consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, what allows for inference. More details on
the estimation method, and on several alternative speci¯cations follow in section 6.
5 Data Sources
5.1 Exchange Rates
In this subsection we de¯ne the primary data set in terms of the nature and maturity of the ex-
change rate, and the extent and frequency of the sample period. The exchange rate series is de¯ned
as the sterling/real exchange as quoted in Lisbon for bills drawn on London with a certain maturity.
The sample period runs between June 2nd, 1854, and May 23, 1891, coinciding with the Portuguese
adherence to the gold standard.






















18By continuous we mean that the ¢xt function is continuous everywhere, namely at the threshold values °0 and °1.
13Contrary to O±cer (1996), and Canjels et al. (2004), we decided to use a weekly periodicity. This
choice is due both to data limitations, and to our appreciation of the market's volatility. O±cer (1996:
64) argues for using monthly averages in the reconstruction of gold points, in order to average out
atypical observations. This may make sense for the New York/ London arbitrage, where until 1866
information crossed the Atlantic with the 9 to 11 days delay of a one-way oceanic trip. It is hard
to justify such a large lag in the information set of the potential arbitrageurs between two ¯nancial
centers, like Lisbon and London, that were separated by 5 days of steaming in the North Atlantic.
Canjels et al. (2004), and also Boyer-Xambeu et al. (1994), on the other hand, prefer to collect data
at the highest possible frequency for the period (daily). Although we are convinced that the market
did not display such short oscillations in the exchange, we also tried to collect daily data, but it was
only available for 287 weeks (or 15% of our sample). Nevertheless, in this sub-sample we only observed
within-week exchange rate changes in 111 weeks.19 Indeed, in the ¯nal sample itself, de¯ned with
weekly periodicity, there is also no change of price between two successive weeks in 40% of cases.
The primary source for the exchange rate data were the bulletins of the Lisbon stockbrokers chamber.
These were published fairly regularly in the o±cial government newspaper, the Diario do Governo. In
order to ¯ll in the gaps in this source, we also made use of the information published in the Portuguese
¯nancial press of the time.20 Overall, these two sources covered 92.4% of the sample period. The
remaining 7.6% (146 weeks) were interpolated, by assuming that the exchange didn't change relative
to the last week for which we had information.21
As mentioned in section 3, foreign exchange operations during this period were mediated by ster-
ling bills traded in the Lisbon market. O±cer (1996) emphasizes the need to identify the dominant
instruments of gold arbitrage for an accurate reconstruction of its costs. Because we could not ¯nd as
detailed information as O±cer did on the maturity of the bills traded, we followed the rule-of-thumb of
choosing the type of bills, which in each period had the highest data frequency in the sources.22 The
division of periods by type of bills is in Table 1.23
[Table 1 about here.]
One further problem with the available data is that, up to the last part of our period, the sources
only quote one price for the pound, instead of the usual \bid" and \ask" rates. According to O±cer
(1996: 72) single rates typically quoted the price at which pounds could be bought from brokers
and dealers, that is, the \ask" rate. O±cer reconstructs the \bid" rates by using data on the broker's
commission in the foreign exchange market. His preferred measure of the exchange rate is the midpoint
19Moreover, in 68 out of the 111 weeks there was only one price change.
20The publications we used were, by decreasing participation in the sample, the Commercio de Portugal, the Gazeta
da Bolsa, the Jornal do Commercio, and the Commercio do Porto.
21We choose to do so, instead of simply interpolating, for two reasons. First, because almost all the missing values
corresponded to single weeks (123 in 146). Second, because there is a reasonable expectation that the sources we used
would skip a week whenever there was no a change in the market.
22This is taken as an indirect measure of the liquidity of each category of bills.
23Again because of data gaps we deviated from this rule in 61 weeks (3.2% of the sample), for which we used quotes
of bills of di®erent maturities from those in Table 1. Also notice that the 'checks' drawn on London can be interpreted
here as demand bills.
14between the \ask" and the reconstructed \bid" rates. We could not ¯nd independent information on
the commissions charged by Portuguese ¯nancial agents, so that our series may overestimate the \true"
measure of the exchange rate in the earlier part of the sample.24
The ¯nal operation to reach our exchange rate series is to make it homogeneous. To do this, we









where E is the demand bill-equivalent, and Em is the quoted exchange for a bill with a maturity of m
days, discounted at rate b.25 This transformation of the base exchange rates requires two additional
pieces of information: the maturity m of bills used in foreign exchange transactions, and the appropriate
discount rate b. Regarding the ¯rst, we have not yet been able to ¯nd a representative compilation
of these maturities, so we used the maturity stated in the rates. As the actual maturity of sterling
bills traded in Lisbon would have been no larger than the stated, this implies an underestimation of
the \true" demand bill-equivalent rate, as can be gathered from equation (10). This underestimation
bias, which may exaggerate the incidence of gold import violations (minimize gold export violations),
probably compensates the overestimation from using \ask" rates.
With respect to the discount rate b, we had to decide which money market, Lisbon or London, to
use as reference. Following Perkins (1978) we compared the available data on discount rates in the two










We have a full series of exchange rates for bills of 30 days of sight, 90 days of sight, and of checks
only for the period 1886-1891, which we compare with the weekly data published in the Economist on
the Lisbon \open market" short-term interest rate, and the London discount rate on 90 days bills.26
As can be seen from Table 2, there's an appreciable coherence between short-term London discount
rates, and the implicit rates in the 30 and 90 days bills, contrary to the Lisbon rates.
[Table 2 about here.]
Naturally, the correlation is higher between the London rate for 90 days bills, and the implicit rate for
the same maturity. However, the largest complete series that can be recovered from the Economist for
24That is, we took the midpoint for periods in which we had both rates. We also attempted to infer the commissions
from the observations in which we had both rates, 1886-1891. Around 2/3 of the inferred commissions lie between 0.05%
and 0.12%. However, because there is considerable volatility in the data (coe±cient of variation = 0.95), and we only
have data for the last 6 years of the sample, we choose not to extrapolate this information.
25That contemporaries used simple instead of compound discount is attested both by O±cer (1996: 68) for the US
case, and by contemporary evidence for the Portuguese case. On the latter see Arag~ ao (1964: 227).
26The data on market discount rates comes from Neal and Weidenmier (2003), and from our own soundings in the
Economist. To be more precise, we used the rates for \3 months trade bills" until 1880, and for \90 days bank bills"
thereafter. In principle, the exchange operations carried out by the Bank of Portugal should involve bills of the highest
quality, i.e. bank bills. However, that was not necessarily the case for other possible arbitrageurs. Anyway, the Economist
only started separating the rates for bank and trade bills in 1881.
15the whole period is the 90 days bills. Therefore, as O±cer (1996), we chose to use this rate throughout,
irrespective of the maturity of the exchange rates. This was possible for the period 1860-81. For earlier
years, when the Economist did not publish this information, we used the Bank of England's bank
rate.27
A ¯rst summary description of the data is given in Figure 1, and in Table 3. For ease of interpretation
all values are expressed as percentage deviations from par.28
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
Overall, the pound exchange rate in Lisbon kept itself within a band of §3% from par. Within this
band, the exchange tended to gravitate more frequently towards depreciation (above par), which was
natural to expect from a peripheral economy with a systematically negative trade balance, and highly
dependent from foreign capital °ows (especially through the public debt), and the remittances of its
emigrants.29 Nevertheless, there were also periods of persistent rates below par: 1854-56, 1862-63, and
1871-75. Although our current knowledge of the Portuguese balance of payments is very imperfect, the
available data seem to suggest that these three periods coincided with improvements in the external
accounts, mainly driven by emigrant remittances from Brazil.30 We also divided the sample in Table
3 into 3 sub-periods to stress the main tendencies observed in the evolution of the exchange series.
Beyond the trend towards depreciation against the pound, we can also observe a systematic decrease in
volatility, when measured either by the standard deviation or the maximum amplitude of the exchange
rate.
As an alternative representation of the data, we also estimated the Kernel density of the exchange
rate.31 The results are summarized in the last two rows of Table 3, and in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The latter Figure clearly illustrates two developments. On the one hand, the drift of the distribution
to the right, which corresponds to the tendency for depreciation of the Portuguese currency, already
mentioned; on the other, the convergence, through time, to a well-behaved target-zone model µ a la
Krugman (1991). Indeed, in the later two periods there is an obvious bi-modal distribution of the
exchange. The values of these modes are given in Table 3. Interestingly however, the values of the
modes for the later period do not conform with our results for the estimation of the gold points, as
27The latter from Hawtrey (1938), Appendix I.
28The style of the time was for the pound to give the par, that is, the rates were quoted as pence per thousand
Portuguese r¶ eis. The par was accordingly de¯ned as 53 1
3 pence per thousand r¶ eis, which was equivalent to 4500 r¶ eis per
pound.
29On the foreign position of the Portuguese economy in the second half of the nineteenth century see Reis (2000) and
Mata (2002).
30A similar association seems valid for the improvement in the exchange after 1886, which coincided with a positive
shock to the remittances and foreign capital in°ows (public debt) in the years 1887-1890.
31We used a Gaussian Kernel with optimal bandwith (in the sense of minimizing the mean integrated square error)
hn = 0:9¤¾x
n1=5 , in which ¾x is the standard deviation of the sample, and n the sample size.
16we will see. In particular, as the lower mode is positive, this would imply that rational market agents
expected the exchange to always °oat above par, which probably may have meant that the system, in
their eyes, lacked credibility.
5.2 Direct Expenditures
There were two classes of arbitrage costs: direct expenditures of gold shipments, and indirect costs.
The former class is common to both types of arbitrage: gold export and import. O±cer (1996)
catalogues ¯ve main direct costs: freight (and other expenditures in transit), insurance, commissions,
abrasion, and deviations from the Mint parity. Our main source for these expenditures is the accounting
records of the Bank of Portugal for 285 shipments of gold from London, between 1857 and 1891.32
Although we only have the records for one direction of the gold °ows, it is reasonable to assume that
the majority of the direct expenditures were symmetric for the two directions of gold shipments. Figure
3 illustrates the time path of the three main classes of direct expenditures.33
[Figure 3 about here.]
The overall downward trend in these ¯gures accords with the increasing market e±ciency, and can
be traced to speci¯c improvements in the technology. In particular, the stepwise pro¯le of the freight
charges is in direct correspondence with the size and type of the ships used in the Lisbon-Southampton
route. As the accounting records of the Bank of Portugal also kept the name of the ship used in each
operation, we could cross that information with the technical speci¯cations of the ships as described
in the Lloyds' Register.34 During the ¯rst \plateau" (1850s), freight costs were of the order of 0.5%
for sailing ships with an average displacement of 200 tons (gross). The second level, around 0.2%, and
lasting until the 1870s was characterized by an evolution towards larger ships (average 800 tons), built
of iron, but still with mixed propulsion, sail and steam. Finally, the later period, with costs around
0.15%, bene¯ted from another increase in scale (average 3200 tons), and from the generalization of
iron steamships.
The forth major component of the direct expenditures consisted of commissions paid at several stages
of the arbitrage transaction. Contemporary sources mentioned three types of payments: to buy the bill
(\brokerage"), to sell it (\commission" proper), and to buy the gold in London (in case of gold import).
We chose to ignore the latter one under the impression that the largest Portuguese ¯nancial houses
would have their own correspondents in London. As for the remaining two, our sources pointed out to
fairly stable rates throughout the whole period. \Brokerage" was quoted at 1/8% in Lisbon, and 1 ￿
in London, while a \commission" of 1/2% was charged to small customers in both markets, reduced
to 1/4% for larger values. Because the larger customers would dominate the market for sterling bills,
we decided to include the smaller value of 1/4%.35 Hence, we included total costs with commissions
32We used both the Di¶ ario, and the Mestre auxiliar ledgers, as well as the internal records of foreign correspondence.
33\Other expenditures in transit" includes costs with boxes and with transhipment from London to Southampton.
34Actually, it was not always possible to match this information, because some ships had fairly common names, such
as Nile, London, or Sultan. We used the Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping for 1857, 1868, and 1887.
35We based these estimates on evidence from the accounting records of the Bank of Portugal, and on some treatises
on foreign exchange. For an earlier example of the latter see Guerra (1837), and Monteiro (1889) for the later end of our
17of 0.375% (1/8%+1/4%) for gold import, and 0.35% (1￿+1/4%) for gold export.
Like O±cer (1996), we ¯lled in the blanks between these 285 observations with simple interpola-
tions.36 As regards O±cer's last two classes of direct transaction costs, i.e., abrasion, and deviations
from the Mint parity there are several reasons to ignore them. Under normal circumstances, abrasion
should be added to the costs of exporting gold, on the assumption that the British monetary authorities
(namely the Bank of England) would receive abraded gold coins by weight, instead of tale. Conversely,
abrasion would reduce the transaction costs of importing gold, inasmuch as it could circulate in Portu-
gal at par. This line of reasoning assumes that the dominant form of gold shipped was domestic gold
coins. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, gold coins clearly prevailed in the gold imported, and also in the
gold exported to London.
[Table 4 about here.]
However, the Portuguese monetary law of 1854 gave legal tender to British sovereigns, and British
gold coins had a disproportionate share in the total stock of monetary gold held in Portugal.37 Based
on this evidence, it is possible to identity the British sovereign as the dominant specie used in both
export and import arbitrage. The question therefore hinges on the quality of the sovereigns shipped
from Lisbon to London and vice-versa. In a letter of October 5, 1888 to the Portuguese Treasury, the
Financial Agency of the Portuguese government in London described the care of the Bank of England
in assaying all gold coins entering or leaving its safes:
The sovereigns that enter the Bank are all weighed with several very ingenious machines,
driven by steam, which reject to one side the non abraded coins, and to the other those,
which by their long circulation no longer have the weight with which they had originally
came out of the Mint. This system thus guarantees the export only of gold with legal
weight.
This implies two things. First, gold sovereigns imported from London had a high quality, which
eliminated the possibility of pro¯ting from the introduction of debased coins at par in Portugal.38
Second, any abraded sovereigns sent to London would be easily detected there, and bought by weight.
Anyway, in the case of private arbitrageurs, they could readily get their gold in Lisbon without cost
from the Bank of Portugal, and this coin would have to of high quality for reputational reasons, since
period.
36Nevertheless, it should be noticed that our data base is much more detailed than the one that O±cer uses. For
instance, for our period, he bases his interpolations on 5 data points for freight and 4 for insurance.
37According to Reis (1990) between 85% and 90% of total gold coins in circulation between 1854 and 1891. For the
repeated complaints in Portugal about the scarcity of domestic gold coin see the same source. Actually, the foreign trade
statistics only distinguish between Portuguese and British coins before 1880. That all gold imports from Great-Britain
were made in British coin is attested both by the foreign trade statistics in this sub-period, and also by the records of
the Bank of Portugal, that only bought sovereigns and half-sovereigns. On the side of exports, although the statistics
are less reliable, British coins outnumbered Portuguese currency 55 to 1, in the same sub-period.
38This does not exclude that such arbitrage was indeed practiced. Some contemporary sources, like Arag~ ao (1964:
230) mention protests against abraded sovereigns entering Portugal from Spain. But as this was happening in border
regions, they may never have reached Lisbon.
18it might be known in London where the sovereigns came from.Abrasion losses are therefore not taken
into consideration.
Likewise, there was no added cost from the use of \gold devices", such as charging or o®ering a
price of gold di®erent from the o±cial Mint parity. The Bank of England always sold sovereigns at par
(O±cer 1996: 147), and these were accepted, also at par, under the Portuguese monetary law.
There was a ¯nal component of the direct transaction costs, which was speci¯c to the Portuguese
case. The Portuguese state taxed gold exports until 1886, at 4537 r¶ eis per Kilogram of pure gold until
1860, and 5000 until March 24, 1886.39
5.3 Indirect costs
The second class of transaction costs, the indirect ones, has to do with the opportunity losses, or
pro¯ts foregone, during the time that funds used in arbitrage were retained somewhere in the Atlantic
Ocean. These costs, which were usually ignored in the contemporary descriptions of gold arbitrage,
varied with the direction of the shipment. In the case of gold exports, because the exchange operation
was completed at the start, and only the amount of gold necessary to pay for the bill at maturity
was sent to London, there was no interest cost. Gold imports, on the other hand, required that the
arbitrageur wait the time corresponding to a round trip before he could cash his pro¯t. In order
to estimate this latter cost, we need an appropriate interest rate for the best short-run alternative
opportunity, and we need to know the likely duration of a trip between the two money markets. Data
limitations made us use the discount rate of the Bank of Portugal as the proxy for the best alternative
interest income. For the duration of the round trip we took 12 days. This estimate is based on two
elements. The ¯rst is the duration of the maritime voyage between Lisbon and Southampton, which
the notices of maritime tra±c of the port of Lisbon placed between 4 and 6 days, throughout our
period.40 We took the midpoint, i.e., 5 days. The second is an addition of 2 days for travel between
the harbor and London, and for the necessary time to buy the gold to ship back to Portugal. Interest
cost is then given by: 2d£ i
365, where d=6 days, and i is the (annualized) discount rate of the Bank of
Portugal.41
O±cer (1996) also adds a component of risk pr½mium and normal pro¯t to his estimates. Despite
the essentially riskless nature of arbitrage, there were some residual components of risk, namely the
possibility that interest costs could vary with the duration of the maritime travel.42 However, most
of the instances of risk mentioned by O±cer (1996: 172-73) do not apply to the Portuguese case,
once more because of the peculiarity of having as the dominant arbitrage instrument the sovereigns,
which simultaneously had legal tender in both countries. Because of this residual nature of the risk
39As we are taking the sovereign as the dominant instrument for arbitrage, we calculated the value of one Kg of pure
gold based on the o±cial de¯nition of the sovereign in the Portuguese monetary law of 1854. This implies a cost of
0.708% until 1860, and 0.813% thereafter.
40These notices were regularly published in the Diario do Governo.
41We are also using simple interest in this formula, as O±cer (1996: 161).
42That is, either because of an unexpectedly long passage, or because the best alternative rate i changed signi¯cantly
between the moment of deciding to export gold, and the moment of realizing the revenue from the operation.
19component, and also because it is not clear to us how to disentangle the interest loss from the \normal
pro¯t" components, we chose not to try and add an estimate for this type of indirect costs. Nevertheless,
we will duly have in account this possible omission when commenting later on the size distribution of
the gold points' \violations".
6 Results
In this section we will use our data to approach the workings of the Portuguese gold standard from a
number of perspectives. In the ¯rst two sub-sections, we test the e±ciency of the system in producing
one of its most cited properties, viz., exchange rate stability within the band de¯ned by the gold points
(what O±cer 1996 calls \market e±ciency"). For this purpose, we marshalled the results from the
two methodologies described in section 4. Next, we turn to a di®erent perspective, which started with
Krugman's (1991) seminal paper on target zones (TZ). We not only test some of the implications of
the TZ model, but also use it to give a quanti¯ed answer to the important question of the credibility
of the Portuguese adherence to the gold standard.43 Finally, we make use of another piece of evidence,
the direction and timing of gold shipments between Portugal and the UK, which, theoretically at least,
provides another testable corollary of the e±ciency of the monetary regime.
6.1 First pass: gold points and their \violations"
We will start the description of our empirical results with the direct reconstruction of gold points,
following the methodology described in sub-section 4.1. Table 5 and Figure 4 summarize the estimates
of the gold export (GX) and import (GM) points for the pound/real exchange in Lisbon.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
The ¯rst impression from these results is the overall decrease in the estimated gold points, which on
average are halved between the ¯rst and the last sub-periods. If we decompose this trend by the
components of the two gold points, we come to the conclusion that the decrease was largely driven
by the declining costs of freight and insurance, with the exception of the last sub-period for the GX
point, where the abolition of the duty on gold exports is dominant in explaining the narrowing of the
gold point spreads after 1886.44 Indeed, it is interesting to notice the clear reaction of the exchange
to this reduction in costs, which may be taken as con¯rmation of the in°uence of gold arbitrage in
determining the °uctuation spreads of the pound in Lisbon (more on this in sub-section 6.4).
The simplest test of the \market e±ciency" of the system is to count the number, size, and persistence
43This relates to O±cer's \regime e±ciency".
44Except for the last period of the GX, the share of freight reductions varies between 70% and 86%, while the fall
in insurance costs explains between 23% and 28% of the decrease in the gold points. The contribution of the other
components is much smaller and, in some cases, negative, e.g., the opportunity cost in the GM increases between the
¯rst and the second sub-periods, due to a rise in the average discount rate of the Bank of Portugal.
20of the gold points' \violations" (to use Morgenstern's 1959 expression). This information is summarized
in Table 5. On a ¯rst approximation, our results lie closer to the negative results of Morgenstern (1959),
and Clark (1984) than to O±cer's remark about the \remarkable e±ciency" of the dollar/sterling gold
standard, or to Flandreau's (1995) results for the bimetallic exchange between Paris and London. For
the whole period, we counted 12.9% weeks of GX violations, and another 4.6% of GM violations, with
an average duration of 3.7 weeks for both types of violations. Moreover, the pro¯t opportunities were,
on average, quite high throughout. These values seem too high to characterize the workings of an
e±cient arbitrage mechanism. Nevertheless, there are reasons why this conclusion may not be fully
warranted. To begin with, the period we study does not entirely overlap with the periods of reference
for the estimates of the two other bilateral exchanges. In particular, the dollar/sterling data estimates
tend to be concentrated in the last two decades before World War I, whilst Flandreau's (1995) stop in
the 1870s. In this sense, the comparison with the dollar/sterling case may be too stringent, because it
is possible that technological improvements, only available in the later period, could have substantially
improved the market e±ciency of the system. On a related point, Canjels et al. (2004) consider that
O±cer's (1996) gold points estimates are \almost certainly too high", thereby underestimating the
incidence of \violations". Unfortunately, the authors do not report the frequency of violations under
their estimates, so that we cannot compare our own results to theirs. Still on this point, the data in
Table 5 show some improvement in the e±ciency of the system, when measured by the frequency and
duration of gold points' violations. This is true for the GM point, which converged from 16.8% of
violations in the ¯rst sub-period, to less than 1% in the last one, and with a persistence of about 1/4th
of the former period. This is contradicted by the evidence for the GX, whose frequency of violations
actually increased throughout the whole period, with no substantial decrease in average persistence.
Second, and more important, looms a question of measurement error, probably on the side of the
underestimation of some components of arbitrage costs. As discussed in sub-section 5.2, our estimates
are mainly conservative, in that they exclude components, which we do not ¯nd relevant for the case at
hand (abrasion, deviations from Mint parity), or for which we could not ¯nd data (normal pro¯t and
risk pr½mium). To try and gauge the possible relevance of such omissions, we identi¯ed the exchange
rate observations that lay outside the correspondent gold points by up to 0.3125% of parity (see the
last lines of each of the sub-panels in Table 5). This value comes from adding O±cer's (1996) estimates
for abrasion, normal pro¯t, and risk pr½mium for the later end of our sample (1871-90).45 We then
take these observations as a measure of a possible overestimation of gold points' violations. The results
imply a distribution of gold points' violations highly skewed to the right, because the frequencies of
exchange rate points outside this enlarged band falls to 2.0% in the case of the GM, and 4.3% for the
GX point. Average persistence also falls to 2.6 weeks for GM, and 3.4 for GX violations.
Nonetheless, we also cannot exclude the presence of measurement error (of unclear direction) in those
cost components, for which we have high-frequency information, like freight or insurance. We therefore
turn to the results of the indirect estimation of the gold points' spread from the arbitrage model of
sub-section 4.2.
45If anything, they will underestimate the value of such items of expenditure, which fell over time.
216.2 Indirect estimation
As Canjels et al. (2004), we run di®erent versions of the model of equation (9). Contrary to these
authors, we did not adjust a model of symmetric thresholds, given the evidence on the di®erent nature
of some of the transaction costs between the two types of gold arbitrage.46 We start with a model of
asymmetric, but time-invariant thresholds, estimated both under the other assumptions of the model,
and relaxing them. We then move on to °exibilize the time dimension, namely to allow the thresholds
to change over time. We do this in two ways. First, we repeatedly estimate model (9) with a moving
window of 2 years. Next, we re-specify (9), so that the thresholds °0 and °1 can follow a smooth time
trend.
Table 6 lists the results of the estimation of the TAR(3,1,1) model of equation (9).
[Table 6 about here.]
In order to identify the parameters of the three regimes (\lower" or GM violation, \middle" or within
band, and \upper" or GX violation), we imposed the restriction that, at least, 2.5% of observations
should fall in each of the outer regimes, while the middle regime should include no less than 5%
of observations.47 To be able to test for the random walk behavior of the exchange in the middle
regime (as implicit in (9)), we added a constant ¹0 to the middle branch of equation (9), and a slope
coe±cient ¹1 to the lagged value of the deviation of the exchange rate from par, i.e., we estimated
xt = ¹0 + ¹1xt¡1 + vt;if °0 · xt¡1 · °1. For more details on the estimation procedure see Appendix
1.1.
Despite allowing for asymmetric thresholds, the estimation converged to the same gold points in
absolute value, of about 0.87% of parity. The threshold parameters were estimated very precisely,
less so the speeds of convergence. Contrary to assumed in the model, the hypothesis of random walk
within the gold points' spread (i.e. that ¹0=0 and ¹1=1) is not sustained by the data.48 Relative to
the results of the direct reconstruction, the estimate of the GX is substantially lower, which implies a
higher estimated frequency of violations of 38.2%. On the contrary, the new value of the GM is close to
the one we obtained through direct reconstruction, with a more similar frequency of violations (6.8%).
The estimates of the convergence speeds imply a half-life of the deviations from the gold points of 0.82
weeks for the GM, and 2.48 weeks for the GX point. Such speeds are nearer to the original estimates of
the persistence of gold points' violations from Table 5 than to the revised estimates with an enlarged
measure of the costs of arbitrage.49
46For instance, the absence of an interest cost in gold export transactions, or the presence until 1886 of a duty on gold
exports, but not on imports.
47For the full sample 2.5% means 49 observations. We choose this value to match roughly with the minimum frequency
of violations of a gold point from the previous sub-section, which was 2.6% for the GM point.
48Although the coe±cient of ¹0 is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, that on ¹1 is lower than one, which indicates
a mean-reverting process. The Wald statistic for the joint hypothesis is Â2 = 18:66.
49Although under the partial adjustment mechanism of equation (9) full convergence back to the respective gold point
takes in¯nite time, we can measure, e.g., the time it takes to complete 99% of the convergence. For the GM violations we
get 5.45 weeks, and 16.5 for the GX. To compare, Canjels et al. (2004) results imply about 5.8 weeks for 99% convergence
in their model of symmetric and constant thresholds.
22Finally, we also test the model speci¯cation. In running a TAR model with 3 regimes, we are
assuming there are no additional non-linearities in the exchange rate behavior, after controlling for the
two thresholds. Luukonen et al. (1988) propose a test for this hypothesis. The test statistics (LST)
are in the second column of Table 6 (see details in Appendix 1.2). The p-values underneath each LST
statistic imply that there is no evidence of additional non-linearities.
From the results of Table 6 it appears obvious that this model is too restrictive to account for the
dynamics of gold arbitrage in our period. We accordingly relaxed some of the assumptions underlying
the TAR(3,1,1) model, namely:
- the order and the delay of the selection variable, and
- the time-invariance of the thresholds.
To address the ¯rst question, we ran TAR(3,k,d) models with 1 · k · 3 and 1 · d · k, and chose the
model that minimized the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The chosen model was a TAR(3,2,2).
We defer the full results to Appendix 1.3, and only report in Table 7 the main statistics.
[Table 7 about here.]
First of all, the estimates of the gold points are larger in absolute value, and the LST statistics allow
again to reject the hypothesis of additional non-linearities. Then, by comparing the new estimates of
the gold points to the steady-state implied by the AR(2) processes in the outer regimes we can also
check, informally, whether the exchange did indeed converge back to the gold points. This seems to
have been more the case for GX than GM violations. Similarly, the steady-state in the middle regime
appears close enough to zero (as in a white noise process), even though we cannot assign a test statistic
to this statement. Nevertheless, we are still not comfortable with such results in that they imply an
excessive frequency of ine±ciencies in the system.
Our ¯nal variation to the model °exibilizes the time dimension. We do this in two alternative ways.
First, we estimate the model with a moving window of 261 weeks (5 years), shifted each time by 104
weeks (2 years). We believe these values strike a reasonable balance between the number of degrees
of freedom, and the over-smoothing problem of the two previous constant thresholds models. In the




To spare on degrees of freedom we reverted to estimating TAR(3,1,1) models. The results of both
methods are summarized in Figures 5 and 6, and in Table 8.51
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
50Again, look for details in Appendix 1.4.
51The full results of the model with smooth time trends are available in Appendix 1.4.
23[Table 8 about here.]
As can be readily seen, the two methods have complementary problems: whereas the moving window
tends to mimic too closely the behavior of the exchange series (implying a somewhat erratic evolution
of the arbitrage costs), the trend over-smooths that evolution. To partly control for the latter problem,
we reestimated the GX trend (°1) adding a dummy for the known discontinuity in the arbitrage costs,
which occurred in 1886 with the abolition of the duty on gold exports. That is, we amended the second
equation of (12) to °1 = (°10 ¡ °d dum1886)e¡°11t, where dum1886 = 1 for all dates after March 24,
1886.
Globally speaking, the estimates of the smooth trend model (especially with the dummy) are closer
to the results of the direct reconstruction in Table 5, then the averages of the 5-year moving windows.
Nevertheless, the 95% con¯dence intervals for the smooth trend estimates (the shaded areas in Figure
6) are somewhat wide, particularly in the earlier period. The over-smoothing problem of the smooth
trend model also seems con¯rmed in Figure 6. Indeed, by forcing a single smooth trend throughout,
the ¯rst version of this model overestimates the GX in the earlier period. Although the introduction of
the dummy dum1886 seems to have been warranted, it doesn't make sense to further re¯ne the model
with other categorical variables for observed discontinuities in arbitrage costs. This would, in fact,
mimic the direct reconstruction of the gold points with interpolation of sub-section 6.1.
After this conspectus of alternative estimates, it seems ¯tting to pass a preliminary judgement
on their relative merits. First of all, despite the variation in time trends, all estimates agree in what
is arguably their most important property, namely, the declining costs of gold arbitrage throughout
the period. Although a necessary condition for an increasingly e±cient arbitrage, this decrease doesn't
seem to have been su±cient to bring about a \remarkably e±cient" exchange rate mechanism. True,
the reported e±ciency depends on the estimates of the gold points, which, in the case of direct recon-
struction, are subject to measurement error. The main advantage of the model of revealed preferences
lies in the possibility of accounting for unobservable, or not easily estimable cost components. But the
validity of the latter estimates depends crucially on the appropriateness of the pure arbitrage-driven
exchange rate mechanism summarized in equations (1)-(3). For reasons we mentioned in page 12, and
for others to follow, we ¯nd this model insu±cient to describe the workings of the sterling exchange
in Lisbon. Accordingly, we will give precedence, over the next pages, to the estimates from direct
reconstruction of arbitrage costs.
6.3 Target zones and credibility
Since the inception of the TZ literature, there have been some attempts at testing its implications,
and using its insights for the gold standard period (Flood et al. 1990, Giovannini 1993, Hallwood
et al. 1996). We are interested in both, i.e., testing the correspondence between the assumptions
and implications of the model and the Portuguese data, and using the TZ framework to discuss the
question of the credibility over time of the Portuguese gold standard. We start with a brief abstract
24of the relevant theory.
Krugman's (1991) model starts from a minimalist log-linear monetary model of the exchange rate
(all variables in natural logs):
et = ft + ®Et (det)=dt (13)
where et, ft, and E() stand for the spot exchange rate, a composite measure of fundamentals, and the
expectation operator, respectively.52 Krugman also assumes purchasing power parity, and uncovered
interest parity (UIP). The latter can be notated as it = i¤
t +Et (det)=dt, where it (i¤
t) are the domestic
(foreign) short-run interest rates.53 From these two relations, Krugman derives the basic result of the
TZ literature, the honeymoon e®ect that implies a S-shaped relationship between the spot exchange
e and the measure of fundamentals f, within the °uctuation band. For illustration take the case of a
positive shock to the fundamentals. If the exchange rate was allowed to °oat freely, it would change
one-to-one with the fundamentals. Not so in a TZ, where the instantaneous expectation of depreciation,
Et (det)=dt, will dampen the e®ective change in e. Because f increases, the domestic interest rate must
fall to clear the domestic money market. But from UIP this implies an expected appreciation of the
domestic currency, Et (det)=dt < 0, which, by (13), attenuates the e®ective depreciation (increase in e).
In the limit, if e threatens the upper band limit (the GX in the gold standard), the expected intervention
of the monetary authorities would correct the level of f downwards, returning e to the band. In the
case of the gold standard, no such interventions were typically observed, but the adherence to the
convertibility rule, and the opportunities for gold arbitrage were equivalent means to the same end
result. That is, in this example, a gold out°ow would produce the required reduction in fundamentals.
Going back to the UIP condition, this logic allows for the domestic interest rate to fall below the
international rate, despite the fact that the exchange depreciates. That is, a TZ allows the monetary
authorities a measure of autonomy in conducting domestic monetary policy. Naturally, this comes at
a cost, which is the credible commitment of the authorities to defend the band. It is this credibility
that justi¯es the expected appreciation in the example.
To sum up, the theory implies three corollaries that we can test, viz., a mean-reverting exchange,
a distribution of the exchange more concentrated in the band limits, and a negative relation between
the interest rate di®erential it ¡ i¤
t and the exchange.54
The ¯rst corollary is indeed supported by the data. All the test statistics in Table 9 allow to infer that
the exchange series is strongly mean-reverting. These results are also robust to di®erent sub-periods.
[Table 9 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
On the contrary, the contemporaneous negative relation between the interest rate di®erential and the
exchange, predicted by the theory, is not borne out by the data. We use weekly data for the exchange
52f includes the money supply, and any other variables a®ecting the demand or the supply of money.
53Furthermore, the country is assumed to be small, which implies that i¤
t is exogenous, a reasonable approximation
for Portugal.
54The pattern of the exchange density is a consequence of the \smooth pasting" property of the solution for the
exchange rate in a TZ model.
25rate, and the short-run British and Portuguese interest rates. Because we only have data on Lisbon
\open market" interest rates from 1885 on, we use bank rates for the interval 1854-84.55 The two scat-
terplots of Figure 7 support, if anything, a moderate-to-strong positive relation, which bodes problems
for the credibility of the TZ.56 However, if we split the sample into 3-year periods, we do get a negative
and signi¯cant relationship in three periods: 1854-56, 1866-68, and 1872-74.
Yet another problem lies in the distribution of exchange rates. As mentioned previously, this distri-
bution, although presenting the bimodal pattern predicted by \smooth pasting", shifted to the right
throughout the period, so that in the last decade of our sample both modes stood above par (see
Figure 2 and Table 3). Even though it is not clear what the shape of the exchange distribution on a
non-credible TZ would be, this displacement seems to ¯t with the idea of increasing expectations of
devaluation of the Portuguese currency. This questions the assumption of Krugman (1991) that the
TZ is credible.
Bertola & Svensson (1993) extended Krugman's model to a situation where agents can expect a
realignment of the central parity. A high expectation of realignment naturally implies a non-credible
TZ to start with. The authors rede¯ne the exchange rate into two components: et = ct + xt, where ct
is the central parity and xt is the exchange deviation from it, as we have been using. This implies a
similar decomposition of the expectation of devaluation:
Et (det)=dt = Et (dxt)=dt + Et (dct)=dt (14)
so that the last term is the expected realignment. Replacing (14) in (13) and rearranging, we get to
another solution for the deviation of the exchange within the band:
xt = ht + ®Et (dxt)=dt (15)
The fundamentals term is now a composite of the previous term and of the expectations of realignment:
ht = ft ¡ ct + ®Et (dct)=dt. Incidentally, compared to equation (13), this new equation no longer
implies a necessarily negative relation between the exchange and the interest rate di®erential. As in
Krugman's model, a negative relation is still to be expected between x and Et (dxt)=dt (expected rate
of depreciation within the band), but UIP holds for the \total" exchange rate e, and it is not clear
what would be the sign of the association between the current exchange and the expected realignment.
In this sense, the evidence of Figure 7 may not be enough to reject the credibility of the Portuguese
pegging to gold. Two other tests of credibility have been proposed in the literature.
The ¯rst, originally proposed by Svensson (1991), uses the gold points' estimates to gauge the
maximum limits of deviation of the exchange within the band (the xt). That is, if we note xm
t and xx
t
as the gold import, and gold export points, respectively, then:
(xm
t ¡ xt)=dt · Et (dxt)=dt · (xx
t ¡ xt)=dt (16)
Now, using (14) and UIP we get to:
(it ¡ i¤
t) ¡ (xx
t ¡ xt)=dt · Et (dct)=dt · (it ¡ i¤
t) ¡ (xm
t ¡ xt)=dt (17)
55We used the Lisbon \open market", and the London \3 months" rates from Neal & Weidenmier (2003).
56Still, transaction costs might also blur the evidence in this case. See Flandreau & Komlos (2003).
26This expression gives the equivalent to a \100 percent" con¯dence interval for the expected realign-
ment rate in each period. We represented the results for the Portuguese case in the two panels of Figure
8, where we replaced xm
t and xx
t with their values estimated by direct reconstruction in sub-section
6.1. Once again, we are limited by the availability of data on short-term market interest rates in
Lisbon, which we proxy with the discount rates of the Banks of Portugal and England before 1885. In
the second panel of Figure 8 we superimpose the two \con¯dence intervals", calculated from discount
(shaded) and market (non-shaded) rates.
[Figure 8 about here.]
The global impression we obtain from this Figure is that of a non-credible parity for the greater part
of Portugal's commitment to gold. Only in the 1850s, the early 1860s, and the early 1870s do these
results imply no expectations of devaluation (when the con¯dence interval intercepts the 0 line), or
expectations of revaluation (both limits of the interval below the 0 line). These intervals partly coincide
with periods of persistent exchange nearer or below the par, although the correlation is not perfect.
Concentrating in the sub-period 1885-91, for which we have information on market short-term interest
rates, it is interesting to note that, despite the relative improvement with the abolition, in 1886, of the
duty on gold exports, the con¯dence interval remained steadily above the 0 line (apart from some brief
periods). The rate of expected devaluation after 1885 averaged 2.8% per annum. This is in agreement
with the other evidence of lack of credibility, namely from the Kernel estimates of the distribution of
the exchange rate in this period.
Another interesting observation regarding the second panel of Figure 8 regards the relation between
the two intervals. Because the Bank of Portugal's discount rates were often below market rates,
the expected rate of depreciation is underestimated when calculated with the Banks' discount rates.
Moreover, because expression (17) requires an estimate of the gold points, our results are conditional on
these estimates. Instead of repeating the exercise with our di®erent gold points' estimates, we now pass
to the second test of credibility, proposed by Bertola & Svensson (1993), and which is independent
from the gold points. Rather than taking a maximalist estimate of the expected variation of the
exchange within the band (the width of the gold point's half-intervals), we now solve equation (14) for
Et (dct)=dt by replacing a direct estimate of Et (dxt)=dt. Although this is potentially a complicated
estimation problem, the literature on TZ ¯nds that a simple linear approximation produces fairly
sensible estimates:57
xt+m ¡ xt = ®0 + ®1xt + Át (18)
According to equation (18) the m-period ahead change in the deviation of the exchange can be
predicted from a linear projection of the contemporary deviation. For the sake of comparison with
Figure 8, we ran this regression with m = 1 week. Estimates are in Table 10, the Dickey-Fuller test
supporting once more the hypothesis of mean reversion.
[Table 10 about here.]
57For the references see Hallwood et al. (1996).
27With this estimate, we can now form a 95% con¯dence interval for the expected realignment by
subtracting the 95% con¯dence interval for the coe±cient of xt in (18) from the interest di®erential,
similarly to (17). The outcome is represented in Figure 9.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Relative to Figure 8, the outlook is very similar, in terms of the distribution of the periods of credible
and non-credible parity. There are some di®erences, though. On the one hand, the average expected
rate of depreciation (measured by the midpoint of the con¯dence intervals) is between 9% and 15%
smaller, depending on the sub-period and the interest rate series used.58 On the other, and not
surprisingly, the substitution of the estimate of Et (dxt)=dt for the maximum variation within the
band yielded narrower intervals.59
At this point it is interesting to compare the results from the previous two tests of credibility with
the \e±ciency ratios", with which O±cer measures what he calls \regime e±ciency", that is, \the
probability of maintenance of the gold standard with the existing mint parity" (O±cer 1996: 255). We
refer the reader to this author's book for the speci¯c assumptions behind such ratios, and just reproduce
the results for our case in Table 11.
[Table 11 about here.]
Under the assumptions stated by the author, the interpretation of the results is straightforward: a
ratio above (below) 100 means a non-credible (credible) parity. This measure yields results, which
are in broad agreement with the two previous con¯dence intervals, except that it identi¯es the period
after the abolition of the export duty (1886-1891) as being credible. However, it is considerably less
informative, because it is based on period averages, and does not provide an estimate of the devaluation
expectations. Furthermore, it is very sensitive to the gold points' estimates. Depending on whether
we use our original estimates from sub-section 6.1, or add to them 0.3125%, as in Table 5, the period
1882-91 is assessed, respectively, as non-credible, or credible.60
To ¯nalize the section on credibility, we try to identify the underlying determinants of credibility.
We will follow Hallwood et al. (1996) in estimating a simple two-country reduced-form model of the
expectation of realignment on a number of variables usually included in theories of exchange rate
determination. Despite the data limitations, we were able to include 7 covariates in the regression:61
- the log di®erence in lagged banknote circulation mt¡1 ¡ m¤
t¡1
- the log di®erence in lagged income yt¡1 ¡ y¤
t¡1
- the di®erence in in°ation rates ¼t¡1 ¡ ¼¤
t¡1
58This may compensate the problem of underestimation alluded in connection with the \100% con¯dence intervals".
59We also estimated the con¯dence intervals for longer horizons m, namely 1, 3, and 12 months. The results were
similar, except for an increasing width of the intervals.
60We are also not prepared to accept some of O±cer's assumptions, particularly an uniform distribution of the exchange
within the gold points. Even if the exchange rate follows a mean-reverting process within the gold points, an uniform
distribution is only a particular case of a stationary process.
61Starred variables correspond to the UK.
28- the log di®erence in the balance of trade btt¡1 ¡ bt¤
t¡1
- the log di®erence in a measure of government's debt burden ft¡1 ¡ f¤
t¡1, to allow for a \¯scal
channel" of monetary policy
- the di®erence in the reserve ratios of the banks of Portugal and England rt¡1 ¡ r¤
t¡1 and
- the lagged value of Et (dct)=dt itself, to control for the persistence in expectations.62
For details on the data sources, we refer the reader to Appendix 2. Table 12 lists the results from three
alternative speci¯cations.63
[Table 12 about here.]
The three alternative models di®er in two respects: the measure of the money supply, and the reserve
ratios. In regressions (1) and (3), we proxied for the log di®erence in money supply with the bank
note issues in Portugal and Britain. This is naturally a very imperfect substitute for the money supply
in a typical monetary model of the exchange rate.64 However, because the only aggregate available
for Britain in this period is M3, which was not relevant to characterize the Portuguese money supply,
we were forced to adopt this solution.65 In alternative, regression (2) uses the money base, although
at the cost of a smaller sample, because the British data is only available since 1870.66 Regression
(3) di®ers from the other two in that it uses a broader de¯nition of the reserve ratio for the Bank of
Portugal. Ideally, we want to capture with this variable the ratios, which were e®ectively tracked by the
monetary authorities, and in°uenced their conduct of policy. As argued in Reis (2002), the directors of
the Bank of Portugal based their decisions on the ratio of gold and net external reserves to short-run
liabilities. These net \external reserves", which the Bank had an obvious interest in holding, because
they were pro¯table and could be easily converted into gold, included such disparate components as
foreign stocks, and bonds of the Portuguese external debt, ¯rst class bills on foreign markets, and
accounts in foreign bankers.67
With these limitations in mind, the striking conclusion to be taken from Table 12 is the autoregres-
sive behavior of the expectations of realignment. All three models predict a relatively high level of
persistence (from 0.6 to 0.73), which incidentally is the only coe±cient signi¯cant throughout. Despite
the small sample size, this seems to be in agreement with the long-term drift towards depreciation,
62Actually, this was precisely assumed in equation (18).
63The LM statistics refer to the Breusch-Godfrey test, and they allow to reject the hypothesis of serial correlation of
residuals in all three regressions.
64Especially for Portugal, where the narrower de¯nitions of the money supply (M0 and M1) were dominated by gold
currency until 1891.
65The best references to our knowledge on the money supply in the two countries are Reis (1990) for Portugal, and
Capie & Webber (1985), for Britain.
66Otherwise, the sample in regression (1) is limited by the start of a continuous series of Portuguese foreign trade in
1865.
67Unfortunately, we only have the information compiled on these net \external reserves" between 1865 and 1888, which
reduces the number of observations in regression (3) to 23.
29already mentioned. In contrast, almost all the remaining covariates are not signi¯cant.68 Similar re-
sults where found for the dollar/sterling case by Hallwood et al. (1996), which the authors interpret
as a sign that the monetary authorities did not violate the \rules of the game" su±ciently to trigger
a readjustment in expectations. Nevertheless, we did ¯nd one variable to be signi¯cant, namely, the
di®erence in reserve ratios, when we measure the ratio of the Bank of Portugal in the broader sense
de¯ned previously. That this variable is signi¯cant in the \broad", but not in the \narrow" sense
seems to con¯rm Reis's (2002) interpretation of the decision-making process at the Bank of Portugal.
Furthermore, it suggests the idea that the Bank played an important role in keeping the Portuguese
gold standard within the limits of a working TZ.
6.4 Gold °ows
It should come as no surprise that this part of our study is the most fraught with data problems. The
statistics of international gold movements are renowned for their inaccuracy, at least since Morgen-
stern's (1955) classical rendition of the question. For Portugal we have three independent data sources
for gold movements with Great Britain. They are, by increasing frequency of data, the Portuguese
o±cial trade statistics (annual), the returns of the British Board of Trade (monthly), and the gold
imports of the Bank of Portugal (daily).
All three have problems of their own, which may blur their usefulness in testing whether gold °ows
actually occurred in the expected direction during the estimated gold points' violations. In other
words, they are very imperfect measures of gold arbitrage. Starting with the last, the Bank of Portugal
import statistics have three obvious caveats: they only refer to one side of gold arbitrage, they do not
cover all gold shipments from London to Lisbon, but only those of the Bank, and, thirdly, the Bank of
Portugal mostly used these shipments for reasons unrelated to making a pro¯t out of arbitrage (we will
develop this point more fully next). On the upside, these data have the highest frequency, and don't
share in the measurement errors or omissions usual in o±cial trade statistics. Indeed, the source is
the same records used to establish the direct expenditures in sub-section 5.2. Moreover, as regards the
representativeness of these data, the Bank of Portugal gold shipments made up 53% or 73% of total
Portuguese imports from Great Britain, according to the British or the Portuguese trade statistics,
respectively.
The o±cial trade statistics of the two countries have complementary problems. In principle, one
would expect that gold exports would be underreported in the Portuguese data, before the end of
the duty on exports, in 1886. In fact, the British export data are only slightly above the Portuguese
statistics, what may seem surprising in face of the obvious incentives for gold smuggling, at least until
1886. Still, if the illegal export of gold was mainly done via a third country, as Spain, it would also
not show up in the British statistics as an import of Portuguese gold. On the imports side, British
statistics probably overestimate the true °ow, because they include gold reexported from Portugal
68Although the large standard errors do not warrant any de¯nite conclusion, we would like to point out that the
coe±cients of two variables (money supply, and ¯scal burden) are incorrectly signed in all regressions, and that the same
applies to the di®erence in in°ation rates in the middle regression.
30to other countries, namely Brazil and Spain. 69 Indeed, British ¯gures are systematically above the
Portuguese statistics of gold imports throughout the period.
An approximate solution would then be to use the British data for export, and the Portuguese
sources for the import °ows. However, the two sources di®er in frequency and coverage. We could
reconstruct a complete monthly series running from March 1861 to the end of our period, from the
tables of the Board of Trade published in the Economist. Annual Portuguese statistics of the gold
trade are available for 1855-56 and 1861-91, but they don't break up the data by country of origin in
5 years.70 Because of the gaps in the Portuguese series, and the possibility of using monthly data, we
will use the British series in what follows.
Our ¯rst piece of evidence is a simple contingency table, based on the highest frequency data from
the British statistics. In Table 13 we check whether gold °owed in the directions predicted by all of
our estimates of gold points in each month. In building Table 13, we coded the gold points' violations
simply as a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if there was a week in the month when the ex-
change deviated from the parity by more than one of the gold points. This means we are consolidating
the weekly information and ignoring the severity of the measured violations. Even so, we can learn
something useful from this Table.
[Table 13 about here.]
For each gold point, we list the number of months conforming to the arbitrage model (\Flows with
violations"), as well as the cases where it fails - \Flows without violations", and \Violations without
°ows". The ¯rst impression from these ¯gures is that our indicators of gold points' violations do a
very good job in predicting gold °ows (the \Violations without °ows" being fairly rare), but that
they grossly underestimate such °ows (the \ Flows without violations"). This is especially the case of
the GM point, but even in the best case for the GX, our original direct estimates only predict 36% of
months with gold exports. Before rejecting our gold points' estimates as too wide, we should remember
a number of caveats in drawing conclusions from the gold °ows data.
First, there is the possibility that British statistics undervalued exports and overvalued imports of
gold, as mentioned before. Because the simple contingency table only counts instances of gold °ows,
but not their amount, there is no direct correspondence from these biases to the cells in the Table. Still,
one possibility is that the over (under) reporting of °ows would translate into an excessively high (low)
number of months reported with gold imports (exports). If so, this would help to explain the severe
mis¯t between gold imports and GM violations, although the actual impact cannot be quanti¯ed. But
it would also aggravate the problem on the GX side. Second, gold was obviously being shipped between
Britain and Portugal for other reasons than arbitrage. One of these would be the simple settling of
trade accounts in specie, instead of foreign exchange.71 Because a debt had to be settled in any case,
the shipment of gold did not incur any opportunity cost, so that the relevant gold points for this type
of operations would be narrower than for gold arbitrage. Still, if we recalculate the GM points by this
69On this see Reis (1990).
701862-64, 1874, and 1879.
71What O±cer (1996) calls \gold-e®ected transfer of funds" to distinguish from \gold points arbitrage" proper.
31de¯nition we only increase the number of conforming cases from 10 to 17.
Third, and more promising, is the identity of the sender. Taking the original direct estimates as
benchmark, it is possible to count the number of months with gold import °ows, in which the Bank
of Portugal also bought gold from London. Out of the total 260 months with gold imports, the Bank
had gold shipped from London in 124. What is interesting is that in 117 of these we did not record
a violation of the GM. Given that the Bank was not importing gold to reexport it, there had to be
another reason for these shipments, unrelated to arbitrage. Indeed there was.
As mentioned in section 3, the Bank of Portugal, as other central banks under gold, resorted to a
number of \gold devices". Two of them are relevant to our case. First, the Bank sometimes used gold
shipments from abroad as a window-dressing device, which could be useful to face internal gold drains,
because of a loss of con¯dence. It also did so in order to face a shift in the public's preference in favor
of specie. Second, the Bank also tried to in°uence the exchange before it actually reached the GX
point. It o®ered to sell bills on London at a slightly better rate than the GX point. These bills would
either come from the Bank's own portfolio, or were drafts drawn on the Bank's London correspondents
to be covered later.
Unfortunately for the Bank, this device usually had to be carried at a loss, because of the increasing
tendency of the exchange to gravitate above the parity (see Table 3 and Figure 2), which meant that
the bills were probably sold at a lower price than they had been bought for, while the drafts would
later have to be covered with paper bought in worse terms.72 This was especially costly before the
abolition of the duty on gold exports that allowed the exchange to depreciate by an extra 0.8%, which
added to the losses of the Bank. The report of the Bank for 1886 registered an accumulated loss of
£ 64,508 (or 0.23%) from such operations, in 1885-86.
Despite these losses, the Bank of Portugal used this device persistently in order to limit the gold
drain from its reserves. According to the Bank reports of 1884 and 1886, the Bank sold £ 43.7 million
worth of bills on London just in the four last years of the duty (1883-86). The alternative, i.e. import
gold to replenish the co®ers, would have been much more expensive. The Bank estimated that the
gold shipments from London, between 1876 and 1882, had cost 1.5% in direct charges.73 This can be
corroborated for the period 1880-83, for which we have the actual exchange at which the Bank sold
bills on London. Figure 10 compares these rates to the actual exchange in Lisbon and our estimate of
the GX point (original direct reconstruction).
[Figure 10 about here.]
It con¯rms the fact that the rates at which the Bank intervened were below the GX point, and also
that its ability to keep the exchange in that range waned with time. In the last 2 years of this period,
the interventions were being carried below the actual exchange, what meant a loss in managing the
Bank's portfolio of sterling bills, or in covering the drafts open in London. In the ¯rst half of 1882, the
severity of gold exports (represented by the bars in the Figure) even led the Bank to intervene up to
72The Bank also routinely took upon itself the commissions involved in buying and selling the bills used in this
operation.
73Banco de Portugal (1883: 32).
32the GX rate itself.
Notwithstanding these remarks, the magnitude of the mis¯t of the arbitrage model still seems puz-
zling, especially in the GX case. To try to make some headway, we will now use the information on
the size (and not only the timing) of the gold °ows. Tables 14 and 15 contain the results of regressing
the exports and imports of gold on a number of covariates.74
[Table 14 about here.]
[Table 15 about here.]
Starting with Table 14, we were limited in our ability to using monthly data, because some of the
variables are only available on an yearly basis. Nonetheless, the ¯rst two speci¯cations use monthly
information on the levels and one month-lags of the average size of GX violations, a dummy variable
for Portuguese ¯nancial crises, and the discount rate of the Bank of Portugal (BP).75 The regressions
are globally signi¯cant (see the F statistics), but the obvious candidate to explain gold exports, i.e., the
amplitude of GX violations, is not signi¯cant.76 The discount policy of the Bank of Portugal doesn't
seem to have been able to contain the exit of gold from the country, or only marginally so. This is
not exactly surprising, given the severe legal constraints that the Bank faced in managing its bank
rate (on this see Reis 2002). The crisis variable has a greater purchase. We coded it to take a value
of 1 in the months of May-August 1876, and September 1890 - May 1891 to coincide with the two
major Portuguese ¯nancial disturbances of the period.77 According to the estimates, the gold imports
would rise on average by 122 thousand pounds during a crisis month. This conclusion transposes to
the regressions with annual data.
For comparison with the monthly regressions, we provide the results of the (Annual 1) and (Annual
2) regressions, which use the same covariates.78 We excluded the lags, however, because it seems
excessive to admit a one year delay for a variable to in°uence gold exports. Contrary to the monthly
regressions, the measure of the violations of the GX point has some explanatory power. The variable
Balance of Trade, which is coded in the same way as in sub-section 6.3, is introduced as a proxy for the
\gold-e®ected transfers" we mentioned above. That is, if a substantial share of gold °ows was driven
by the settling of international debits, instead of arbitrage, this would be captured by a signi¯cant and
negative estimate for the coe±cient of this variable. This is indeed the case in regression (Annual 3).79
74All reported ¯gures were estimated by GLS (Prais-Winsten) to correct for autocorrelation. We also ran the OLS
regressions with Newey-West standard errors, and the results didn't di®er materially, either in the sign, size, or signi¯cance
of the estimated coe±cients.
75We only include the lagged discount rate, because of an obvious endogeneity problem. That is, higher gold export
volumes would typically trigger a rise in the discount rate.
76We used our original direct estimates of the gold points from Table 5 to form the violations series, because those had
the best ¯t from the contingency table 13.
77For the coding of the 1876 episode we followed Reis (2002), whereas we chose the failure, of the Banco Lusitano, one
of the largest deposit banks, in September 1890, to start the period of ¯nancial and monetary instability that would lead
to the abandon of gold in June 1891. In the regressions with annual data we coded 1876, 1890, and 1891 as crisis years.
78With the exception of the discount rate in regression (Annual 2) because of the endogeneity problem already men-
tioned.
79The number of observations in this regression is down to 27, because we only have data on foreign trade from 1865
on.
33The structure of Table 15 is similar. Like in the exports case, the average GM violations are not good
predictors of gold imports in the regressions with monthly data.80 Compared to Table 14, the dummy
for crisis is now only marginally signi¯cant, while the average expectation of realignment, which we
took from the previous sub-section on TZ, is signi¯cant and has the right sign.81 Still, the sign pattern
is strange. A rise in the lagged expectations of realignment leads to an increase in the imports of
gold, as expected. Not so a contemporaneous realignment expectation, even though this result is not
signi¯cant.
Again for comparison, the third and fourth regressions replicate the ¯rst two with annual data.
The most signi¯cant di®erence is the now strong and signi¯cant e®ect of the measure of violations of
the GM point. The crisis indicator has also a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient, while the average
expectations of realignment have an insigni¯cant e®ect upon the volume of gold imports. Finally, for
the third annual regression we introduced two other covariates - the trade balance variable, already
used in Table 14, and the a measure of currency hoarding. The widespread phenomenon of hoarding
of gold coins is generally attested by the contemporary literature, and it sometimes led to internal
drains of gold that a®ected the Bank of Portugal and made it take measures to defend its reserve.82
One of the corollaries of such phenomenon was the abnormally high percentage of gold currency in
the Portuguese money supply. As Reis (2000), we proxied the hoarding intensity by the ratio of gold
currency in circulation over M0. We use this variable to test the \window dressing" motive of the gold
imports of the Bank of Portugal, which seems to have been strong and signi¯cant. Interestingly, the
impact of the trade balance disappears, when combined with the hoarding variable. This may attest
to a number of points, namely, the high proportion of gold imports through the Bank of Portugal to
defend its reserve, and the infrequency of surpluses in the Portuguese balance of payments (that would
establish a positive link between trade and gold imports).
To sum up, the observed mis¯t between the gold °ows data and the predictions on the timing (Table
13) and size (Tables 14 and 15) of those °ows, from the conventional arbitrage model leaves us with
three options. First, to blame the bad quality of the °ows statistics. Second, to recant on the remarks
we made at the end of sub-section 6.1, on the possible underestimation of the gold points. In fact,
we don't think this to be a valid candidate for explanation, for even if we decreased our estimates of
the gold points to match them with the timing of the °ows, there would be a considerable number of
abnormal cases to account for. For instance, if we use the monthly data series, 0.1% of gold exports
and 59% of gold imports occurred respectively below, or above par.
The third alternative is to acknowledge, from the evidence at hand, that the conventional arbitrage
model is too simplistic to describe the real workings of the Portuguese exchange rate mechanism. The
fact that other macro variables (balance of trade, crisis, expectations, hoarding) have an explanatory
80We also introduced seasonal terms in the monthly regressions, but these came out as insigni¯cant, and the estimates
of the other coe±cients were not substantially a®ected.
81We used the second measure of realignment expectations to limit the collinearity between this variable and the
measure of GM violations. As can be seen from equation (17), the upper limit of the interval for Et (dct)=dt is a linear
function of the GM violation.
82For some references see Reis (1990, 2002).
34power over and above the measure of gold points violations seems to warrant such interpretation. In
particular, one should stress the margin available to the monetary authorities to in°uence the exchange,
even in a peripheral country, with no central bank in the modern sense, and with severe legal constraints
as to the use of the bank rate as a monetary policy instrument.
7 Concluding remarks
The reader can take two sorts of messages from the previous pages. The ¯rst sort raises the question
of whether the Portuguese case is a useful addition to the debate on the market \e±ciency" or \inte-
gration", under the classical gold standard; or, instead, is as an illustration of the de¯ciencies of such
debate, and of the correlative need to understand the \fundamentals", or institutional factors that in
each case determined the course of the exchange, together with, or despite the revered \gold points".
In this last section, we recapitulate the main evidence supporting either of these two interpretations,
and suggest a direction for future research.
Despite some disagreement among the three main sets of estimates of the gold points (direct recon-
struction, moving window, and smooth trend), the evidence points to a narrowing band of °uctuation
over time. Depending on the estimation methods, its breadth would have fallen from 16% to 48%
between the limiting periods of 1854-61 and 1882-91. That the exchange reacted to the evolution
of the °uctuation bounds is also con¯rmed by the \natural experiment" provided by the elimination
of the duty on gold exports in early 1886. From a conventional viewpoint, this evolution should be
interpreted as a consequence of the rising e±ciency of the monetary regime in providing exchange rate
stability. Indeed, it seems notable, if not remarkable, that a such peripheral country as Portugal could
have enjoyed some 37 years of relatively unproblematic adherence to gold. During this period, the
Portuguese exchange °uctuated very moderately against the central currency of the system, in 90% of
cases within a band of § 1.8% of parity. Admittedly, by some measures of the gold points, the record
on market ine±ciencies (in terms of the number, size, and persistence, of exchange rate \violations" of
those points) does not compare favorably with the results obtained for two of the core currencies of the
system { the franc, and the dollar. Still, this should not be surprising, given the apparently uncontro-
versial fact that the Portuguese currency had a much less liquid market worldwide (especially forward)
and that Portuguese arbitrageurs could not compete in technology or access to information with their
counterparts in New York, London, or Paris. Alternatively, the high proportion of \violations" might
only be a consequence of our excessively conservative estimates, compared to other similar studies.
Finally, the increase in measured \ine±ciency" in the last years of the Portuguese gold standard could
also be ascribed to the mounting pressures of an unsustainable foreign position, which would unfold
into a simultaneous banking, debt, and currency crisis in the years 1890-91. The data on gold °ows,
°awed as they may be, raise some doubts as to the wisdom of this line of interpretation, especially in
the case of gold imports.
Our second set of messages emphasizes a point, which should have been obvious to contemporaries,
and which has been raised elsewhere in the literature (Reis 2000, 2002), i.e., the incompleteness of
35characterizing an exchange rate regime without fully taking into account its institutional underpin-
nings, especially the banking structure. The Bank of Portugal, although a private corporation, was
bound by the rule of convertibility. Moreover, the Bank was, by far, the largest banking house, the
principal banknote issuer, and the holder of the largest gold reserve in the banking system. It also
tended to enjoy a close relation with the government, a fact often resented by other banks. All these
circumstances combined to make the Bank the leading player in the foreign exchange market, with
a vested, albeit unwilling, interest in the maintenance of stability. The Bank directors knew that an
exchange excessively depreciated would translate into a run on its reserve, an event which they actively
tried to discourage with a number of \gold devices". As mentioned in the sub-section on gold °ows,
a substantial share of total gold imports can actually be traced to the shipments of sovereigns from
London, which the Bank used as a window-dressing strategy, or to replenish its reserves in periods of
larger internal demand for gold.
The Bank also intervened by selling short bills on London at a cheaper rate, in an attempt to pre-
vent the exchange from reaching the GX point, and forcing it to buy sovereigns. For the end part of
our period, we could con¯rm the in°uence of such devices on the course of the exchange, despite the
increasing costs to the Bank (see Figure 10).
In one important respect, though, the position of the Bank of Portugal di®ered from that of other
central banks of the time, namely, its control over its discount rate. Contrary to the Bank of England,
the Bank faced serious legal limitations to its autonomy to conduct a bank rate policy, and consequently
had to resort to alternative \devices" sooner than other banks. Although thwarted in its freedom of
action, it is signi¯cant that the Bank of Portugal deviated as frequently and persistently from the
so-called \rules of the game", as any other monetary authorities of the time. This leads to the topic
of the credibility of the Portuguese exchange as a target zone (TZ).
Recovering a point made by Keynes (1930), the TZ literature demonstrates the considerable leeway
for an independent monetary policy even in the context of a narrow °uctuation band, providing that
the TZ is credible. But the classical gold standard is supposed to have been a credible regime par
excellence. In fact, when we apply the credibility tests available in the literature, we come to the
conclusion more often than not that the Portuguese parity lacked credibility (Figures 8 and 9). Taken
literally, this implies that the Bank of Portugal could not bene¯t from the honeymoon e®ect to set a
lower interest rate in the economy, and, in fact, the reverse was the case. The discount rate of the Bank
of Portugal stood above the British bank rate in 79% of our period of study. On a more fundamental
level, it would be interesting to inquire into the factors that determined this credibility, and understand
how it was possible to sustain a non-credible parity for so long. Our incomplete data set only allows a
preliminary answer to these questions, but the results in Table 12 point again to the relevance of the
behavior of the Bank of Portugal in this respect.
Finally, a suggestion. Canjels et al. (2004) conclude their article by stressing the relevance of the
estimation of the gold points as the \key ingredient in a fundamental method of market integration
analysis", while o®ering their methodology as a promising approach to any study of market integra-
tion, namely among currencies. We are prepared to accept both of these as valid points, but if a
36broader lesson can be drawn from our Portuguese tale it would be that \the forest should not be
missed for the trees". To our mind, an equally important research agenda would be to integrate the
detailed data gathering involved in reconstructing (O±cer 1996) or estimating (Canjels et al. 2004)
gold points into a broader picture of the classical gold standard. The latter would of necessity combine
pure \market e±ciency" with credibility, speculation, and the autonomy of monetary policy, not to
mention the institutional arrangements particular to each country in the system.
37Appendix 1
1.1 CLS algorithm and distributional properties
The CLS algorithm is applied in two simple steps:
- Given values for the thresholds (°0 and °1), we estimated the other parameters by OLS within
each regime, and collect the residual sums of squares.
- To select among thresholds, we used a grid search and picked the threshold values that minimized
the sum of the residual sums of squares of the three regimes.
The ¯ner the grid the higher the precision of the threshold estimates. However, precision comes at a
cost of computational burden. We decided to de¯ne a fairly coarse grid in intervals of 0.217% of parity,
or 1/8 of pence. Ideally, we would like to re¯ne the grid to intervals of 1/64 pence (the maximum
detail with which the pound was quoted in Lisbon), but that implied too long a convergence delay for
some variations of the model.
In order to test the random walk behavior of the exchange series within the band, we estimated the
model in levels, instead of ¯rst di®erences. That is, instead of equation (9), we ran CLS on:
xt =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1 ¡ ¸0)xt¡1 + ¸0°0 + vt if xt¡1 < °0
¹0 + ¹1xt¡1 + vt if °0 · xt¡1 · °1
(1 ¡ ¸1)xt¡1 + ¸1°1 + vt if xt¡1 > °1
(19)
The asymptotic distributional properties of the estimators of continuous TAR models have been
established by Chan & Tsay (1998). Let µ be the vector of parameters, et ´ xt ¡ E(xtjµ), and
Ht = @et










in which U ´ E (H0







1.2 Tests of non-linearities
Luukonen et al. (1988) o®er three procedures to test linear versus Smooth Transition Autoregressive
(STAR) models. As Canjels et al. (2004) we followed their \augmented ¯rst-order procedure", which
had the best small-sample properties in the simulations of the former authors. Given a TAR(R,k,d)
model, this procedure has three steps:
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, which allows to reject the null
hypothesis (of no additional non-linearities) for su±ciently high values.
1.3 Unrestricted TAR models
To test the order k and the delay d of the selection variable of a TAR(3,k,d) model, we estimated
the 6 combinations of:
xt =
8
> > > <
> > > :
¯1
0 + ¯1
1xt¡1 + ¢¢¢ + ¯1
kxt¡k + vt if xt¡d < °0
¯2
0 + ¯2
1xt¡1 + ¢¢¢ + ¯2
kxt¡k + vt if °0 · xt¡d · °1; 1 · k · 3;1 · d · k
¯3
0 + ¯3
1xt¡1 + ¢¢¢ + ¯3
kxt¡k + vt if xt¡d > °1
(21)
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(22)
where R is the number of regimes (3 in our case), nr the number of observations falling in regime r,
and ^ ¾2






As mentioned in the text, the model that minimized the BIC was a TAR(3,2,2), whose results are in
Table 16.
[Table 16 about here.]
Because this model is not continuous, the asymptotics are di®erent from the restricted TAR model. On
the one hand, as shown by Chan (1993), the intercepts and slope parameters in each regime have the
same asymptotic distribution of standard OLS estimators.84 On the other, the threshold parameters,
although
p
N-consistent, converge in distribution to a random variable which follows a compound Pois-
son process. Given the complexity of the latter, we only report the OLS estimators for the standard
deviations of the beta coe±cients.
1.4 Smooth trends
We only want to make two remarks to this model. One refers to the estimation, and the other
to the asymptotic properties of the estimators.
Relative to the CLS procedure to estimate equation (19), the only di®erence is that we now need
two grid-searches to identify each gold point - one for the multiplicative constant, and another for
the parameter of the exponential. To spare on computational burden we de¯ned the grid search as 4
steps of increasing precision. We started with grids between 0.005 and 0.05, with steps of 0.005, for
the constants, and between -0.001 and 0.001 (steps of 0.0002) for the exponential parameters. After
this ¯rst iteration, we repeated the grid search within intervals of § 5 times the previous value of the
step, with a new step worth a tenth of the former one. And we repeated this procedure two extra
times, so that the ¯nal estimates should be within §0.000005 of the \true" value of the constant, and
84See, as well, Tong (1990: 385).
39§0.0000002 of the \true" parameter of the exponential.
Despite the time-varying thresholds, the model is still continuous, hence, the asymptotic properties
derived by Chan & Tsay (1998) still apply. We only need to re-specify the vector µ to include the extra
parameters, i.e., µ ´ (¹0;¹1;°00;°01;°10;°11;¸0;¸1). As for the con¯dence intervals in Figure 6, they
were estimated from the asymptotic distribution of µ by using the so-called \Delta method".
Table 17 lists the estimates of the two variants of this model, i.e., with and without the dummy
for the abolition of the duty on gold exports. The impact of the 1886 tax hike is con¯rmed by the
positive and signi¯cant estimate of the coe±cient of °d. Moreover, the over-smoothing in the ¯rst set
of estimates can also be inferred from the fall in the estimated constant (°10) from 4.88% to 2.71%,
and in the rate of decrease (°11) in the GX arbitrage costs from 0.096% to 0.040% per week. All
coe±cients were estimated very precisely, with the exception of °10 and ¸1 in the second speci¯cation.
In fact, the latter result is strange, because the estimate of the convergence speed back to the GX
point has the wrong sign and is not signi¯cantly di®erent from 0. Also contrary to intuition is the
fact that the estimates of ¹0 are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, which violates the trendless random
walk assumption for the exchange within the band. As in the time-invariant speci¯cation of Table 6,
the joint hypothesis of random walk within the gold points is rejected for both variants of the smooth
trend model, with Wald statistics of 21.18, and 8.40.
[Table 17 about here.]
Appendix 2
The data sources underlying the results of Table 12 are as follows.
Banknote circulation: for Portugal the data comes from Reis (1990), for Britain from Mitchell
(1998).
Money base: the same source for Portugal, whereas for Britain we used the data in Capie & Web-
ber (1985).
Income: we used Lains's (1991) \Total Production Index" for Portugal, and Mitchell (1998) again
for the British GDP.
In°ation: the annual rates of increase in consumer price indices are from Val¶ erio (2001) for Portu-
gal, and Mitchell (1998) for Britain.
Balance of trade: we de¯ne this variable as the ratio of exports to imports. Foreign trade statistics
come from Val¶ erio (2001) and Mitchell (1998).
Debt burden: de¯ned as the ratio of debt service charges to total government revenue. Data from
Mitchell (1998) for Britain, and Mata (1993) for Portugal.
Reserve ratios: we used the de¯nition of Reis (2002) for Portugal (for the data sources see the orig-
inal article). This is the ratio between the total gold reserve of the bank and its immediate liabilities,
i.e., banknotes held by the public, and deposits in the bank. To calculate a comparable ratio for the
40Bank of England, we collapsed the reserves and liabilities of the \banking" and \issue" departments.
The data was gathered from US National Monetary Commission (1910).
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43Table 1: Maturity of bills used in exchange series
1854-76 1877-81 1882-91
30 d.s. 8 d.s. Check
d.s.=days of sight
Table 2: Correlations between market and implicit discount rates, 1886-1891
London Lisbon 30 days 90 days
90 days bills \open market" implicit implicit
London 90 days 1
Lisbon 0.6514 1
Implicit 30d 0.4085 0.2706 1
Implicit 90d 0.6213 0.3068 0.4083 1
Table 3: Summary statistics of Exchange rate, 1854-1891
1854-61 1862-81 1882-91 1854-91
Average -0.1063 0.5782 0.2496 0.3627
Max 2.5792 2.7083 2.4410 2.7083
Min -2.5290 -2.5692 -1.1201 -2.5692
St. Dev. 1.1474 0.8963 0.6290 0.9297
Mode 1 (Kernel) -0.8525 -0.3361 0.1445 0.0119
Mode 2 (Kernel) 0.3177 1.4025 1.2557 1.2795
All values in percentage deviation from par




Sources: Mapas Gerais do Commercio de Portugal com as suas possess~ oes ultramarinas e as na» c~ oes estrangeiras
(1855-56, 1861, 1865-67), Estatistica Geral do Commercio de Portugal (1868-73, 1875-78, 1879), and Commercio
do Continente do Reino e ilhas adjacentes com os Paizes estrangeiros e com as Provincias Portuguesas do
Ultramar (1880-91).
44Table 5: Summary statistics of gold points, 1854-1891
1854-61 1862-81 1882-91 1854-91
GM
Average* -1.21958 -0.93926 -0.75197 -0.94867
St. Dev.* 0.05007 0.05903 0.01737 0.16531
\Violations" 66 19 3 88
Average duration** 3.9 4.8 1 3.7
Average pro¯t*** 20.43 13.01 10.70 18.50
¡0:3125% < Deviation < 0 32 15 2 49
GX
Average* 1.76651 1.5443 0.90958 1.42799
St. Dev.* 0.03984 0.06078 0.40122 0.37731
\Violations" 31 162 56 249
Average duration** 1.9 6.8 2.1 3.7
Average pro¯t*** 9.68 17.27 13.27 15.43
0 < Deviation < 0:3125% 21 106 39 166
* Values in percentage deviation from par ** In weeks
*** Pro¯t measured as annualized rate of return, after discounted expenditures.
Table 6: Restricted TAR(3,1,1) with constant thresholds
Coe±cient Estimate Statistics
°0 -0.00868 # upper 735￿
(0.00236)*** # middle 1060
°1 0.00868 # lower 130
(0.00291)*** §RSS 0.02398
¸0 0.57027 LST(upper) 0.00248
(0.28124)** (0.99876)￿
¸1 0.24358 LST(middle) 0.00191
(0.11730)** (0.99905)




Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis from Chan & Tsay (1998).
***(**) Values signi¯cant at less than 1%(5%) ￿ Values in weeks ￿ p-value.






Steady-state -0.01347 0.00831 0.01360
LST 0.15556 0.01221 0.13727
(0.99952) (0.99999) (0.99965)
45Table 8: Average time-varying estimates of gold points
1854-61 1862-81 1882-91 1854-91 \Violations"
GM
Moving window -0.86800 -0.49910 -0.21700 -0.49782 206￿
Trend -1.75109 -0.91376 -0.42546 -0.95998 48
Trend with dummy -1.24057 -0.62018 -0.27310 -0.65817 159
GX
Moving window 0.86800 1.23690 1.24775 1.17435 395￿
Trend 4.06198 2.11963 0.98693 2.22684 263
Trend with dummy 2.51027 1.89261 0.74606 1.72654 197
Values in percentage of par. ￿ Values counted relative to an interpolation of the gold points' estimates.
Table 9: Tests of stationarity of exchange rate, 1854-91







￿z1(k) statistic of Lo & MacKinlay (1988).








Robust standard errors within curved brackets
Dickey-Fuller statistic in square brackets.
Table 11: O±cer's e±ciency ratios (linear loss function)
Gold points 1854-61 1862-81 1882-91 1886-91 1854-91
Original 135.70 131.04 129.71 78.60 174.25
+ 0.3125% 112.15 104.58 95.89 53.00 103.91
46Table 12: Fundamentals of realignment expectations (Et (dct)=dt)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -16.95713 -25.91386 -7.41287
(15.10172) (17.45975) (15.95384)
Money -0.73776 -2.00094 -1.18103
(0.90746) (1.72775) (0.70945)
Income -7.92340 -9.60244 -5.25278
(6.58752) (6.06364) (6.52578)
In°ation 0.77835 -0.47746 3.38549
(4.33819) (3.75176) (4.68858)
Trade -3.58829 -4.09173 -3.37392
(2.45225) (2.88721) (2.51774)
Fiscal -6.02070 -9.35469 -4.02363
(4.06161) (4.55402) (4.02363)
Reserves -0.47669 -0.27223 -0.50040
(1.04342) (0.77183) (0.17923)**
Et¡1 (dct)=dt 0.64975 0.72546 0.60059
(0.16732)*** (0.72546)*** (0.20176)***
R
2 0.398 0.5092 0.4519
F stat 2.36* 3.67** 3.95**
LM 0.01 0.932 0.001
Sample 1866-91 1871-91 1866-88
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**[*]) Statistics signi¯cant at less than 1%(5%[10%]).
Table 13: Contingency Table - Gold °ows/ gold points, 03/1861 - 05/1891
Direct estimates Indirect estimates
Original +0.3125% Mov. Average￿ Smooth￿
Flows with violations 81 33 80 59
GX Flows without violations 145 193 146 167
Violations without °ows 6 2 12 21
Flows with violations 10 3 35 36
GM Flows without violations 250 257 225 224
Violations without °ows 0 0 5 5
￿ Values counted relative to an interpolation of the gold points' estimates.
￿ Smooth trend estimates with 1886 dummy.
47Table 14: Regression estimates of gold exports, 1861-1891
Variables Monthly 1 Monthly 2 Annual 1 Annual 2 Annual 3
Constant 0.02361 0.00954 0.25759 0.10218 1.07964
(0.00763)*** (0.03838) (0.14904)* (0.04155)** (0.52331)**
Avg. GX viol. -0.19800 0.07349 0.17469 0.48615 0.03925
(0.27468) (0.41999) (0.33959) (0.24491)** (0.38166)**
lag Avg. GX viol. 0.22506 0.35303
(0.19140) (0.41608)








N 363 363 31 31 27
R
2 0.0012 0.0977 0.0065 0.5541 0.6429
F stat 4.02*** 7.73*** 2.62* 5.73** 9.09***
DW 1.90640 1.73159 1.83593 2.00969 1.79807
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**[*]) Statistics signi¯cant at less than 1%(5%[10%]).
Table 15: Regression estimates of gold imports, 1861-91
Variables Monthly 1 Monthly 2 Annual 1 Annual 2 Annual 3
Constant 0.07529 0.06331 0.75675 0.68602 -4.56338
(0.00986)*** (0.01332)*** (0.18742)*** (0.24362)*** (0.82893)***
Avg. GM viol. -3.87102 -2.64765 6.13685 5.31698 3.79913
(3.78737) (2.36565) (1.49589)*** (1.41545)*** ( 1.40483)**
lag Avg. GM viol. 6.95986 4.26245
(7.64382) (4.18524)




Avg. Et (dct)=dt -0.01056 -0.03961 -0.13994
(0.00781) (0.08022) (0.09186)






N 363 363 31 31 27
R
2 0.0195 0.1803 0.2762 0.5267 0.7568
F stat 20.85*** 10.70*** 21.85*** 42.85*** 50.32***
DW 2.07427 1.99866 2.01711 1.52530 1.81177
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**[*]) Statistics signi¯cant at less than 1%(5%[10%]).






¯0 - 0.01289 0.00017 0.00414
(0.00214)*** (0.00009)* (0.00106)***
¯1 0.55443 0.72620 0.49122
(0.08668)*** (0.02539)*** (0.04774)***
¯2 -0.51122 0.25366 0.20433
(0.13634)*** (0.02783)*** (0.07117)***
nr 94 1382 449
Steady-state -0.01347 0.00831 0.01360
LST 0.15556 0.01221 0.13727
(0.99952) (0.99999) (0.99965)
***(*) Values signi¯cant at less than 1%(10%).
Table 17: Results of the smooth time trend models




















# upper 263 197
# middle 1614 1569
# lower 48 159
*** Values signi¯cant at less than 1%.
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